Melissa Chen on X - "In case you missed it: China just launched unprecedented military “drills” around Taiwan. These are de facto incursions on the self-ruled island, involving a record 153 Chinese military aircraft, dozens of navy + coastguard vessels, and cyber-attacks. It surrounded the main island and outer territories, simulating a blockade and practicing an attack. And then the Chinese Coast Guard released the following graphic that shows a satellite image of Taiwan’s main island, and a line of arrows tracking around it in the shape of a HEART. Accompanying script – in the traditional Chinese characters used by Taiwan but not by the mainland – read: “Hi my sweetheart” and “The patrol is in the shape of loving you.” I once heard Peter Thiel say in an interview that China is a “weirdly autistic” and “profoundly uncharismatic” country. This attempt at lovebombing Taiwan (with the full intent of “reunification”) after simulating actual bombing and violence, perfectly illustrates his point."
From 2024
Think China can already take Taiwan easily? Think again. - "China wants the world to believe that it has already decisively won and that no one can do anything about it. But looking past the propaganda, China’s real military strength, while dangerous, is less impressive and more brittle than Beijing would have the world believe. Nevertheless, China’s influence campaign could be effective if it reinforces what China watchers may already tend to believe. For example, the Associated Press has accidentally used a doctored photo from Chinese state media of PLA military exercises. The narrative filters out from there. Many newspapers, television, social media, and academia now all tell the same tale of Chinese overmatch. In short: It has all the doctrinal hallmarks of effective deception. Russia ran a similar playbook prior to its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, depicting its military as an overpowering force. And while Russia is and remains an existential threat to Ukrainian sovereignty, the Russian façade of invincibility was quickly exposed by fierce and sustained Ukrainian resistance against a foe with significant materiel and numerical advantages. It’s another riff on the story of David versus Goliath. What China and Russia fail to remember is that in that story, David wins... China certainly has the air and maritime strength to establish a blockade around Taiwan, but maintaining one could become strategically tenuous for Beijing if it upends China’s economy, especially its international trade. It is also operationally tenuous due to factors such as logistical sustainment, maintenance, and airspace control and coordination. Blockade demonstrations such as Joint Sword 2024A are incredibly costly and fully stress Chinese capabilities, despite their temporary nature. A full, protracted blockade over time will stress the Chinese military system at a higher order of magnitude, making sustainment suspect and vulnerable to disruption. Should the United States and its allies intervene militarily, the “patrol boxes” vaunted on Chinese diagrams of their latest drill could just as easily become “kill boxes” for Taiwanese and US forces to target Chinese ships, especially those off of the Island’s eastern coast. Chinese power projection from its east coast to Taiwan’s west coast is relatively straightforward, and China is likely to maintain superiority along such lines of operation. But Taiwan’s east coast is more easily supported by allies and partners, who could intervene from the territory of Japan and the Philippines or via air and naval power from the Pacific. While China would likely maintain military dominance in the Taiwan Strait, maintaining it east of Taiwan is a fool’s errand. Policymakers should also highlight the sheer difficulty of a cross-strait attack. An amphibious assault from China into Taiwan would be larger and more complex than the Allied invasion of Normandy in World War II, requiring joint planning and coordination that the bifurcated and politically divided services of the PLA lack. A more apt analogy might be the failed Allied Gallipoli campaign of World War I, because China would likely lack the ability to achieve operational surprise and would be sailing into deadly waters filled with mines and munitions. And while Chinese troops may eventually make it to Taiwan’s shores, they would likely find themselves stranded and contained. Establishing a lodgment is one thing; securing and expanding it is another. A 2023 report by Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham identifies the many difficulties China would face in establishing a lodgment and other approaches that the United States and Taiwan could pursue to contain such a lodgment or prevent its establishment. The weaknesses inherent within an authoritarian, communist system only exacerbate these operational factors."
From 2024
Suicide Reveals Taiwanese Army Dangerously Unprepared for Chinese Invasion - "not only is the Taiwanese military facing a serious shortage of soldiers and an entirely dysfunctional reserve system, as my previous reporting for Foreign Policy revealed, half of its tanks may not be able to run—and even fewer have functional weapons. These failures are costing lives even before China fires a single shot. As Taiwanese politicians showcase flashy U.S. weapons bought with taxpayers’ money, the logistics inside the military remain so abysmal that a young army officer killed himself after being pressured to buy repair parts out of his own pocket... the 269th Mechanized Infantry Brigade isn’t some rear-echelon unit but a major combat formation strategically stationed around the outskirt of Taoyuan City, northern Taiwan. It is expected to bear the brunt of ground fighting to stop any invading Chinese troops from reaching the basin of Taipei, Taiwan’s capital. If the 269th is in such bad material shape, how about the rest of the Taiwanese military? Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) does not officially disclose how many “major combat platforms” are in a mission-capable state. During computer-simulated exercises such as the annual Han Kuang war game, however, the military simply assumed its units would have 90 percent fighting strength in terms of personnel and at least 85 percent equipment as mission-capable. “Those numbers are worthless. They have no basis in reality,” James Huang, a retired army lieutenant colonel who has become a prolific military writer and a vocal critic of Taiwan’s defense ministry... On Taiwan’s internet forums, there is no shortage of netizens claiming to be veterans, who complain about the misfortune of having served in logistics and armory jobs. They write horror stories detailing not just buying parts with own money, but also how they were forced to engage in practices like writing fake paperwork and maintenance logs, hiding “surplus” parts from inspectors, conducting hasty and substandard repair tasks, even stealing parts from other units in preparation for equipment inspection or exercise. A Taiwanese army master sergeant, who remains in active service and has long experience in logistics units, confirmed many of these accounts... “If we are talking about something that resembles U.S. standards, I would say 30 percent of the tanks are in running conditions and have functional weapons.” The problem doesn’t stop there, the master sergeant explained, because ammunition, fuel, and field repair resources are also almost always in chronic shortage unless a unit is about to participate in some major exercise... Chang Han-ching, a retired navy captain and a researcher for the Taiwan Center for International Strategic Studies, believes it was the Taiwanese military’s hasty yet critically flawed downsizing that hollowed out its logistics. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Taiwan committed itself to cutting the force size from half a million strong to fewer than 200,000. Much of the changes were planned by the Office of the General Staff for Operations and Planning of Taiwan’s Defense Ministry, where Chang was a staffer. “Politicians wanted to shrink the size of the military to shorten and eventually get rid of conscription, the top generals obliged. Given rising threats from China, cutting combat units is out of the question. Guess where they cut instead? Yes, logistics, of all things. As if leaving combat units unsupported will do any good.”... The root cause of problems, therefore, appears to go far deeper than just broken tanks and not enough mechanics. Interviewees suggested the answer must lies somewhere between the military’s dysfunctional organizational culture, lack of civilian audit and oversight, and an ineffectual leadership (both military and political) that seems to give little thought to preparing troops for actual war... “Their underlying thinking, based on my observation of the policies, is that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown to be too strong for us to fight militarily anyway. They think Taiwan should just focus on putting up a good show of being tough, buy enough U.S. weapons for display, and pray that Americans come to our rescue when the Chinese call our bluff, which hopefully wouldn’t happen,” Chang said... “Speaking strictly from my heart as a retired officer I would never doubt—not even for one second, that the mass majority of our soldiers and officer corps are dedicated to defending the country, and Taiwan can expect every one of them to do their duty on the battlefield—however much equipment is working,” Yu said."
From 2020
Richard Hanania on X - "American experts on China go to Taiwan to encourage the country to defend itself against China. They're taken out to ice cream by retired Taiwanese naval officers, who tell the Americans that Taiwan doesn't want to fight and will basically surrender."
Will Taiwan Just Give Up? - The Atlantic - "Even a few years ago, pandering to China would have been a losing strategy for politicians in Taiwan. The ruling government of President Lai Ching-te, whose Democratic Progressive Party has been in power since 2016, has urged the U.S. to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses in anticipation of a Chinese attack. Cheng and her Nationalists have done the opposite. Their control of Parliament has allowed them to block defense spending, taking particular care to stall the domestic production of drones and other inexpensive weapons that Ukraine has used to great effect against Russia... “Drones should not be used as weapons,” she said with a smile, “but they should be used to deliver bubble tea.”"
China is too weak to invade Taiwan successfully - "invading an island nation like Taiwan is a very different proposition to Russia’s assault on Ukraine, which has mainly consisted of sending columns of tanks and troops across the land border of its neighbour, supported by artillery, missiles and fighter aircraft. The Ukrainian military, moreover, has only enjoyed a modest ability to defend itself from Russian aggression, as demonstrated by Kyiv’s constant appeals for Nato countries to provide more sophisticated weaponry and supplies. By contrast, Taiwan possesses its own well-trained air force, batteries of state-of-the-art US Patriot air defence systems which are more than a match for China’s new generation J-20 fighter aircraft, as well as boasting a highly motivated army. Taiwan is not Ukraine, and the Chinese military is a long way from being able to mount the type of large scale, and complex, amphibious landing operation that would be necessary to take control of the island. For, despite the vast sums the Chinese Communist Party has spent developing its forces, the country is still playing catch-up in terms of acquiring the strength to challenge America’s military supremacy. The development of China’s two new aircraft carriers is a case in point. While naval powers like the US and Britain have been building this highly specialised military capability for the better part of a century, China only acquired its first carrier in 2012, and is still on a steep learning curve when it comes to making optimal use of them. Another important consideration is that the Chinese military has not been directly involved in a major war since the Korean conflict in the early 1950s, so it lacks the real-time war-fighting experience acquired by the US and its allies in combat theatres ranging from Afghanistan to the Falklands... From Taiwan’s perspective, the most likely threat to its survival is likely to come in the form of political instability similar to the domestic unrest that hastened the demise of democratic rule in Hong Kong. For this reason, many Taiwanese are more concerned about China’s constant efforts to subvert their democracy through support for pro-Beijing political activists and cyber attacks than the possibility of a full-scale Chinese invasion."
From 2022
America’s race to save Taiwan from China relies on friends and neighbours - "Yonaguni, which is part of Japan’s southern Okinawa prefecture, is also the closest territory to Taiwan that the United States, as a Japanese ally, can access – a factor that has become increasingly important as China ramps up its military pressure against Taiwan. Experts agree that US involvement in a war between China and Taiwan would be decisive – without American support it is unlikely that Taiwan would remain autonomous. However, thousands of miles away, the US would be at a disadvantage, unless it can make use of outposts in the region, including Yonaguni. It’s part of a broader militarisation effort that has swept across the Indo-Pacific, from Japan down to the Philippines, as the region prepares for the worst... Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaichi then provoked fury in Beijing after telling parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a response from Tokyo. Shortly after, a Chinese diplomat in Japan intimated that she should be decapitated... the US decision to intervene would ultimately come down to three factors. The first would be how the conflict came about: how did China attack and what justification does it give? It’s likely that China will “characterise something Taiwan does as being politically provocative as an excuse to take action”, said Mr Schriver. Second, the US would closely follow how Taiwan responded in the first few days after the attack. “If Taiwan is not sufficiently resisting the attack and the invasion, if they’re making move to capitulate politically, because of how we’re posturing ourselves, in other words not on the island and not in an alliance, the first few days would be absolutely critical and would inform our decision making,” explained Mr Schriver. The final factor would come down to what else was happening around the world at the time and “how much are we stretched”... Gilbert Teodoro, the Philippines’ defence secretary... has said for years that the Philippines monitors “daily” for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan... With its neighbours and partners preparing for the worst, Taiwan has also been building up its own defence capabilities. Earlier this year, Lai Ching-te, Taiwan’s president, announced a £30bn supplementary defence budget to protect the country against the rising threat from China. It follows a previous announcement that Taiwan would be raising its defence spending to 3.3 per cent of GDP by next year with the goal of reaching 5 per cent by 2030. Approximately a third of the estimated £23.7bn budget is likely to go towards a new multi-layered air defence system known as the T-Dome, which Mr Lai announced earlier this year."
Kareem Rifai 🌐 on X - "Why is Beijing in such a panic? China knows that an American defense of Taiwan practically necessitates Japanese involvement. Without the use of US bases in Japan, US fighter/attack aircraft can't effectively participate in a cross-strait war.
For conflicts not involving Japan, the US needs permission from the Japanese government to engage its bases. Japanese PM Takaichi said that a Taiwan invasion by China would be a "survival-threatening situation" last week. You can connect the dots!"
Robotbeat🗽 ➐ on X - "This. Look at any wargame of Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and typically the only scenarios where it goes well for China is if US are not allowed to use bases in Japan. That’s also why you also see the push to characterize US military bases in Japan as “imperialism.” Obvious psywar"
How China plans to land the world’s largest army on Taiwan - "China has one of the most active shipbuilding industries in the world. Experts estimate that its shipbuilding capacity is at least 200 times greater than the United States’, despite its much smaller military budget ($246bn in 2025 against $850bn). Today, China has an estimated 405 warships to the US Navy’s 295, and is on track to have at least 30 more by 2030. In fact, a recent report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found that, while most of China’s defence firms had been losing revenue, the one area where revenue was rising was shipbuilding... Today, China’s defence priorities are mostly maritime. These include disputes over islands in the South China Sea and its claims over Taiwan, which is across a nearly 100-mile wide body of water... While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has hundreds of warships, these alone would not be sufficient for an invasion of Taiwan, said Tom Shugart, a former US submarine officer and senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He said: “There’s no question whatsoever that if you just look at the grey-painted PLA Navy amphibious assault shipping, it is nowhere near enough to do an invasion.” Instead, China has maximised its dual-use shipbuilding, where civilian vessels are kitted out with military technology. Since 2015, all civilian shipbuilders have been required to ensure that any new ships could be used by the military in the event of an emergency... Alexander Huang, the chairman of the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies, has spent the past 10 years simulating different ways China could attack Taiwan. Based on his research, he sees two possible paths. The first begins with a cyber attack as well as moves against critical infrastructure to “kill Taiwan’s communication control and command control systems”. This strategy would seek to “divide or weaken Taiwan for a swift victory”, said Mr Huang. The second starts with a “maritime quarantine”, which would gradually block Taiwan’s energy supply and communication networks, to cut the island off from the rest of the world. Unlike a blockade, which would be enforced by the military, a quarantine would use coastguard and civilian ships. As an island, Taiwan relies on imports for its energy and food, and a quarantine or blockade could be disastrous. Experts told The Telegraph that its current energy supply – which includes liquefied natural gas, renewable production and coal resources – could sustain the island for about 40 days. A major military operation against Taiwan would likely take four times as long, and, said Mr Huang, China would effectively “squeeze Taiwan until it surrenders”. Beijing has been practising this type of coercion for years. It has routinely deployed hundreds of ships and planes around Taiwan as part of its “grey zone” pressure – activities that fall short of open warfare but aim to demonstrate strength in the lead-up to an actual conflict... The Taiwan Strait is 110 miles wide, but with strong winds and high waves, it is a difficult body of water to navigate. Monsoons and typhoons – especially in summer – make it all the more treacherous... Even with the barges, some experts, including a former defence official who spoke to The Telegraph on the condition of anonymity, were sceptical of China’s ability to land troops on Taiwan. They believe that changing sea levels and commercial construction, among other factors, along Taiwan’s coast have made virtually all of the beaches untenable for a landing operation."
Taiwan’s £7.5tn secret weapon is disintegrating - "Every country in the world relies on these chips, including China, which despite threatening to “reunify” Taiwan by force, imports nearly half of the island’s semiconductors. Economists warn that an invasion of Taiwan would cost the world’s economy £7.5tn – far more than the cost of the Russian invasion of Ukraine or the Covid-19 pandemic. Analysts argue that this very fact would act as a key deterrence against Beijing following through on its threats, as China knows if it does invade, its economy would take a direct hit from the fallout. Known as the “silicon shield”, the theory argues that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry offers it a de facto security blanket, which would stop China from invading – both because of its own dependency on the chips and the US’s, which could come to Taiwan’s defence... leading Taiwan companies within the semiconductor industry have been moving production sites to countries such as China and the US... Taiwan produces approximately 60 to 70 per cent of all the world’s semiconductors and more than 95 per cent of the advanced chips... Beijing’s increasingly hostile rhetoric towards Taiwan and its routine shows of force toward the island has spooked foreign governments and semiconductor customers. Kharis Templeman, a research fellow on Taiwan at the US-based Hoover Institution, explained that the Covid-19 pandemic served as a wake-up call for many companies reliant on chips from Taiwan and had to scramble overnight when their supply was interrupted. It offered an insight into what could happen if China launched an attack against Taiwan, which could result in the supply of chips being permanently cut off... TSMC has kept an insurance policy. The company has made sure that only its mature chips will be manufactured overseas. The production of advanced chips will remain in Taiwan... Experts and those within the industry are also worried about Beijing’s habit of stealing innovations from other countries. “First, they welcome your business. Second, they look at your technology. Third, they build a competitor that can beat you. Then, fourth, they kick you out of the country,” said the engineer."
Rutaso.Japan🇯🇵🐶 on X - "Your argument contains several major historical and legal inaccuracies. Here is a point-by-point rebuttal.
⸻
1. “🇹🇼Taiwan has always been an inseparable part of China.” This statement is historically false. For most of its history, Taiwan was
•an island inhabited by its indigenous peoples,
•later governed by Spain and the Netherlands,
•then ruled by the Zheng regime (effectively an independent state).
In other words, Taiwan spent far more time outside any Chinese rule than under it.
⸻
2. “The Yuan dynasty governed Taiwan.” The Yuan dynasty was the Mongol Empire, not a Chinese nation-state. If you claim “Yuan = China,” then Mongolia, large parts of Central Asia, and Korea would all become “ancient Chinese territories.” This logic collapses instantly.
⸻
3. “Qing ruled Taiwan for about 200 years, so it is Chinese.” The Qing dynasty was a Manchu empire, not a Han Chinese state. The fact that Taiwan was once governed by the Qing does not mean it was part of a continuous Chinese nation-state. Empires shift borders constantly. International law does not treat historical empires as evidence of eternal sovereignty.
⸻
4. “The Cairo Declaration returned Taiwan to China.” This is the most serious error. The Cairo Declaration:
•was not signed,
•was not ratified,
•was not a treaty,
•and therefore has zero binding force under international law.
It was a political statement — nothing more. China is one of the few governments that pretends it has legal weight.
⸻
5. The legally binding decision came from the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1951). This is the decisive point in international law. The treaty states only: Japan renounces sovereignty over Taiwan. It does not say Taiwan belongs to China. Not once. Not anywhere. This means the final status of Taiwan was left undetermined. China’s sovereignty over Taiwan has never been legally confirmed.
⸻
6. “The PRC replaced the ROC in the UN, therefore Taiwan is China.” Another major misunderstanding. UN Resolution 2758 dealt with China’s representation, not territorial sovereignty. It did not declare that Taiwan is part of the PRC. It did not settle the sovereignty issue. It only said: “Who represents China at the UN?” This has no legal effect on Taiwan’s political status.
⸻
Your claims rely on
•historical distortion,
•misuse of international law, and
•political narratives presented as facts.
From a historical and legal perspective, Taiwan has never been confirmed as part of the PRC."
China Building Military on 'Scale Not Seen Since WWII:' US Admiral - "China's rapid military build-up is more expansive than anything seen since World War II, which means it's on track with its 2027 goal to be ready for a Taiwan invasion, said US Navy Adm. John Aquilino. "All indications point to the PLA meeting President Xi Jinping's directive to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027," Aquilino wrote in a testimony to the US Armed Services House Committee. "Furthermore, the PLA's actions indicate their ability to meet Xi's preferred timeline to unify Taiwan with mainland China by force if directed," added the admiral, the outgoing head of the US Indo-Pacific Command... Aquilino wrote in his testimony that of the three main US concerns in the region — Russia, China, and North Korea — China is the "only country that has the capability, capacity, and intent to upend the international order.""
Time to double down on diversity, because it makes the US military stronger
U.S. Deterrence in Taiwan Is Failing - "“My gut tells me we will fight in 2025,” U.S. Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan wrote in a January memo to officers in the Air Mobility Command. The memo, which promptly leaked to reporters, warned that the United States and China were barreling toward a conflict over Taiwan. The U.S. Defense Department quickly distanced itself from Minihan’s blunt assessment. Yet the general wasn’t saying anything in private that military and civilian officials weren’t already saying in public... In 1972, Chinese leader Mao Zedong told U.S. President Richard Nixon that Beijing could wait 100 years to reclaim Taiwan. China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, is not so patient. He has said the island’s awkward status cannot be passed from generation to generation; he has reportedly ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready for action by 2027... Recent investments aside, the United States reportedly lacks enough anti-ship missiles and other munitions to blunt the first Chinese attack, let alone keep fighting after a few days or weeks of high-intensity combat. Amphibious ships, attack submarines, and other critical platforms are all too scarce. Rapidly surging production of any of these capabilities is difficult, thanks to decades of disinvestment in the defense industrial base—and because even now, defense spending is roughly as low, relative to GDP, as at any time since World War II. As aging ships, planes, and submarines are retired in the late 2020s, in fact, U.S. firepower in the Western Pacific will decline, just as China’s current military reforms reach fruition"
Left wingers still claim the US spends too much on defense
War Game Finds U.S., Taiwan Can Defend Against a Chinese Invasion - WSJ - "But the cost would be high: Taiwan’s economy would be shattered, and the U.S. military so battered that it would take years to rebuild, with repercussions for America’s global power."
Taiwan's Army Is a Hollow Shell After the End of Conscription From 2020
