From 2023:
Obstruction of the Justices: Why We Need the Notwithstanding Clause More than Ever
When Ontario Premier Doug Ford invoked the Charter’s “notwithstanding” clause in back-to-work legislation last fall, he became just the latest political leader to be pilloried for using it. Loudly condemned as an instrument of oppression, the notwithstanding clause has been under attack for decades as a political expedient that should never be used. But as Gordon Lee argues, the clause was a carefully considered addition to the Charter intended to safeguard democratic legislatures from the whims of activist judges. And with a Supreme Court that continues to invent rights and expand its power, we are going to need it more and more.
Few issues today arouse more anger and fear-mongering in Canada than the “notwithstanding” clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Many among our governing elites, academia and well-funded activist groups have declared the clause nothing less than a grave danger to Canadian society. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association, for example, has said the clause is “dangerous to every person regardless of their political beliefs,” while Nathalie Des Rosiers, a former law school dean and the current Principal of Massey College at the University of Toronto, declared its use “lethal to the protection of all rights.” Liberal MP Adam van Koeverden has called the clause undemocratic despite the fact that, when it’s invoked, it is done by elected representatives to override a decision made by unelected judges.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has been equally strident, saying “all Canadians” should “be very concerned about” the use of the notwithstanding clause, while NDP MP Matthew Green described Ontario Premier Doug Ford’s use of the clause to keep schools open as “the trampling of constitutional rights,” seemingly unaware that the notwithstanding clause is itself a constitutional right given to Parliament and provincial legislatures, enshrined in Section 33 of the Charter.
Prominent among the arguments advanced – and seemingly persuasive – is that the use of the notwithstanding clause runs contrary to the intent of those who drafted and signed the Charter in 1982. A group of law professors argued in 2018, for example, that the infrequent use of the clause was “precisely what the framers of the Constitution had hoped and predicted.” Many critics believe it was merely a regrettable political expediency adopted to assure passage of the Charter – which had been subject to long and contentious negotiations – but only to be used in truly rare and exceptional cases.
There are, however, several problems with this argument. First, as constitutional law scholar Geoff Sigalet has argued, several framers did not hold such expectations. Many of those involved have been clear that the clause was meant precisely to give elected officials the final say on legislation and was seen as a necessary addition. Even then, the notwithstanding clause has been used very rarely. Over more than 40 years, it’s been used just 21 times by the federal government and all provinces combined. Given the thousands of laws and regulations passed in that period, this should hardly raise alarm bells. Finally, those who appeal to the framers’ alleged intent ignore the other side of the story: that the Supreme Court of Canada has in several key decisions involving the Charter chosen to ignore or even denigrate the framers’ intent.
There are many examples of judicial activism where judges have gone beyond what the Constitution clearly states – inventing rights unknown or unimagined by those who drafted and signed the document. Judges becoming de-facto legislators would seem to pose a danger to Canada’s form of democracy. With no other way to redirect Canada’s top court and its unelected judges, the notwithstanding clause has become necessary to protect Canadians from the Court’s increasingly policy-driven if not downright arbitrary decisions.
The Court Invents the Right to Strike
One recent example of judicial activism is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 2(d) of the Charter, which states that everyone has the freedom of association. In 1987, the court ruled that s. 2(d) did not give unions a constitutional right to collective bargaining or to strike. This understanding stood for many years.
In 2007, however, the Court suddenly changed its mind and invented a right under s. 2(d) to engage in collective bargaining. Eight years later, the Court went much further. At the time, Saskatchewan was suffering through a lengthy and debilitating strike by essential workers. Nurses, snow-plow operators and prison workers walked off the job. The strike meant surgeries cancelled, those near death denied admission to palliative care, and children’s health care services significantly reduced. To ensure this would never happen again, the provincial government passed a law to prevent essential workers from striking.
A group of unions challenged the law, and despite the strike’s effects and its own prior rulings to the contrary, in its 2015 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour decision the Supreme Court struck down the law by invoking a newly-invented constitutional right to strike. Justice Rosalie Abella, whom one prominent scholar has called “Canada’s foremost activist judge,” wrote the opinion, declaring confidently that “[i]t seems to me to be the time to give this conclusion constitutional benediction.” While undoubtedly self-assured in tone, Abella’s use of the word “benediction” – a religious term referring to a pastor delivering God’s blessing upon grateful congregants – presents a disturbing view of how Canada’s most powerful judges see their relationship to the nation’s citizens.
The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour decision has given immense power to unions, particularly those in the public sector. When education workers in Ontario planned to walk off the job last fall, which would have closed thousands of schools indefinitely, they did so with the Supreme Court’s blessing. When Ontario’s government invoked the notwithstanding clause in back-to-work legislation (later revoked), it was pilloried in the media for doing so. Of course, there would be no need for the clause if the Court had not suddenly invented a constitutional right to strike, which the Charter’s framers never envisioned.
Ignore the Original Meaning
Section 2(d) is not the only Charter provision whose original meaning the Supreme Court has ignored. The most glaring example is the Court’s interpretation of s. 7, which states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”
According to several key drafters of the Charter, s. 7 applied only to procedural rights and did not give courts authority to invent new substantive rights. Procedural rights refer to basic rights like a fair hearing or trial – rights based on the legal process, in other words. Substantive rights are much broader and more amorphous. They are essentially practices to which a court has decided to extend constitutional protection. Assisted suicide is one prominent example, a practice which has nothing to do with ensuring a fair procedure before a court or tribunal, but which the Supreme Court declared was a substantive right under s. 7 in its 2015 Carter decision.
