I was feeling snarky when I read this on Young Republic:


A: I suspect this will be my final summary and reply. =) There are two areas
of disagreement, the value of liberal democracy and the means of creating
liberal democracies.

A. The Value of Liberal Democracy

We both agree that liberal democracy has *some* value, but differ over the
extent of the claims that can be made for it as a system.

B says that liberal democracy has absolute value as a universally
applicable system because it promotes "human flourishing" and good
government. He suggests that democracy is a good in itself because it
offers choice (which is integral to flourishing in his view); alternatively
it allows the removal of bad government with minimal bloodshed.

I think that choice is a double-edged sword; free will is needed for
actions to be authentic but it is not true that an increase in choices or
the capability to make a choice will always benefit the agent or society.
There are choices that harm the individual or reduce his or her own freedom
- such as the choice to suicide, for example, or the choice to adopt
certain addictions or self-harming lifestyles. And there are choices that
harm others in ways that you cannot regulate by "harm principle" laws.
Therefore it is a matter of contention, not a given, that more choice is
always beneficial because the act of choosing outweighs the harm inflicted
by a wrong choice. I am afraid I am not liberal enough to stand idly by
when I see a person about to choose to jump off the 12th storey of a
neighbouring building. As for the wonderful liberal democracy which I study
in, it happens to be the land of freely chosen "happy slapping" which is
increasing in popularity, because it makes the perpetrators quite happy.
And so I do not agree that all choices are good choices simply because
choice is good in itself.

But this is a moral argument casting doubt on the benefits of choice in the
general sense, and pretty remote from the sphere of specific *political*
choices. Most people live their lives making choices that are only
tangentially related to politics. It is the free economy (and the
associated respect for property) that provides them with the capacity to
make most of their choices - what to consume, and what sort of work to
engage in so as to be able to consume. Most authoritarian governments have
unwisely followed a Communist model of the planned economy and sought
economic self-sufficiency (though the same could be said of nationalization
in democratic India) and have suffered for it. But those that come to their
senses and seek to conduct trade and commerce in a similar manner to the
capitalist democracies soon provide the same freedoms of labour and
consumption that are essential to the workings of capitalism. And as far as
prosperity goes, they don't seem to be doing too badly relative to the
others.

Increased affluence and education tend to lead to democratization because
the newly empowered classes seek greater recognition, privileges vs.
traditional elites and safeguards for their property and status. But this
"democracy" is not based on political virtue; it is still the sham form
that sees parliament as a tool for pushing my personal/class interests at
the expense of others. For me this is where the true usefulness of modern
democracy lies: people *believe* that the system is a better way of
pursuing their interests, and if they are stymied by the system they accept
that they have been beaten in a "fair game" and the "will of the nation"
must prevail against their own. In other words, they submit quiescently to
political authority - just as their forefathers did in the days when they
believed in the divine right of kings, the mandate of heaven, the principle
of legitimate succession, the correctness of Marxist historical analysis,
or the justice of the anti-colonial struggle. It is the spectre of
Legitimacy dressed in a different garb, telling you that you must agree
because you participated in the last round of elections, you had choice,
you consented etc etc. Therefore stability is preserved with minimal
disorder - very good, I say!

But what about the actual "power" that the people are supposed to have
against their government? Well you've got 48% disempowered people (and
perhaps more, since their opinions change so quickly) sitting in America
now, grumbling on blogs and forums and what have you, but effectively quite
powerless to do anything about it themselves till the next round, when
almost certainly no matter who wins, at least 40% will be similarly
disempowered. And they accept this state of affairs - that's the beauty of
the whole thing. And many actually existing democracies, including the UK,
aren't even of the bipartisan variety that I've described - they have a
single dominant party that has captured the Centre and won't be budged
until they destroy themselves. Like the Labour Party or the Barisan
Nasional or the Indian National Congress or Japan's LDP or the PAP. So you
can complain, but you'll still vote for the only viable option in the end -
or give your vote to the incompetent/extreme others in protest. In
practice, you only "get rid" of bad government once it's become completely
unviable like the Tories in 1997 - or you get rid of fairly decent
government every time because society is split down the middle and the vote
easily goes either way to the Right or the Left. It's better than
dictatorship or military junta, certainly, as far as stable transitions go
- but I don't think the system is worthy of the claims that B is
making. I think in practice it is much closer to the alternative model I
described, that of corporate management.

B. The Means of Getting There

B has very little to say on the subject, since he has expended much
breath trying to make claims for the value of his system. He invokes names
and 233253591037510951 nameless supporters as if that is all that is needed
to create liberal democracy here, there and everywhere.

B finds the issue of the historical origins of his system irrelevant; I
find them relevant because they show that the elements of his system do not
make up an organic, indivisible whole. Instead these elements arise
piecemeal only as a result of the fulfilment of other necessary
preconditions - and therefore they provide empirical material for a study
of what is *necessary* to get to a stable, functioning democracy.

What is necessary, as B admits, is respect for the rule of law,
commitment to playing a "fair game" (i.e. accepting the principle of checks
between various parts of govt) and the presence of strong central
government. When B tries to explain the disasters and tragedies that
have befallen democracies, he usually resorts to an explanation based on
the lack of one of these factors. So we agree - try to have elections in a
country where these conditions don't prevail, like Zimbabwe in 1980, and
you get a Robert Mugabe (who won't surrender power and resorts to pulling
the racial revenge card to split the people and preserve his position).

Now as far as I see, there are two ways of taking concrete action to create
these necessary preconditions for successful democracy. One, you can have a
revolution that brings to power a sufficiently strong leadership with a
firm commitment to liberal and democratic principles; two, you can have
gradual top-down reform. I am highly averse to the former method because
firstly, there's a lot of blood involved and secondly, very often the
"democrats" (like Mr Mugabe) find that the temptation to abuse the large
amount of power they amassed in the process of securing their position is
too great. Everybody claims to want legal recognition and "democracy" when
they are in the opposition - including the communists, Islamic extremists
and so on. As Hume realized a long time ago, if you have enough power to
destroy the present system of government, you are strong enough to be an
autocrat and likely to become one.

The second method may seem more unsatisfactory because it is slower, and
there are likely to be casualties along the way who prematurely attack and
weaken the central government (thus delaying the process of transition) and
are dealt with by force. Also you cannot compel a regime to commit to the
process, or accelerate the change, short of an Iraq-style solution. But it
seems to be the best method that we have - the diffusion of respect for law
and security of persons and property through the demands of the
international market, and the growing pressure from within and without on
the central government who eventually reinvent themselves and open the
political process from the top, as did Roh Tae Woo in South Korea and the
KMT in Taiwan in the 1980s.

As for Singapore, B has complained about how bad it is (relative to his
ideal model) and mentioned one victim of the historical process of creating
strong central government and economic prosperity in this country. There
are other victims - but that's the past, and it's not much use crying over
spilt milk. In fact the passing of that generation is itself (in some way)
a condition for further change, a change already in progress on the
academic front (as seen from the new papers on Singaporean history
reassessing the Left of the 1950s and 60s). When those directly involved
are gone and passions have been cooled, we can talk about it and write
about it and do things differently. Like the equivalent of ending visits to
the Yasukuni war shrine. But not yet, it seems. Not quite yet. And in the
meantime, I don't see the secret police dragging B away from his
computer as he types his reply. =)


And so I replied, like so:

>I suspect this will be my final summary and reply.
Given that people keep talking past each other, I really think (and
hope so).


> B says *snip*
The deluge has been not a little unconfusing, so even though I suspect
you're misrepresenting him I shall hold my peace. No doubt he will
make his own stand clear.


>There are choices that harm the individual or reduce his or her own
>freedom - such as the choice to suicide, for example, or the choice
>to adopt certain addictions or self-harming lifestyles.
So I suppose A is in favour of paternalistic intervention for
people's own good? The trouble is how it is decided what is good. In
the Soviet Union dissidents were sent to asylums for electro-shock
therapy because, not recognising the goodness of the party, they were
considered insane. For that matter, in the Soviet Union you were
officially atheist since religiosity was considered a self-harming
lifestyle. More power to the people!

I suppose A is also in favour of banning cigarettes, alcohol (or
alcohol above 40% proof if he's feeling charitable) and base jumping.
After all, they harm the individual and reduce his own freedom.


>And there are choices that harm others in ways that you cannot
>regulate by "harm principle" laws.
"I am harming people even though I am not harming people." Discuss.


>I am afraid I am not liberal enough to stand idly by when I see a
>person about to choose to jump off the 12th storey of a neighbouring
>building.
The corollary to the right to life is the right to death. To force
people to live on when they have no desire to is to make a mockery of
life itself.

I suppose you are also against unplugging brain dead patients. If you
are ever in a Terri Schiavo situation I'll be sure to testify on your
behalf to keep the feeding tube in you. After all, since the soul
enters the body at the point of conception it doesn't leave even if
the brain has died.


>As for the wonderful liberal democracy which I study in, it happens
>to be the land of freely chosen "happy slapping" which is increasing
>in popularity, because it makes the perpetrators quite happy.
??? Happy slapping? Have you been watching too many Happy Tree Friends
episodes?


>And so I do not agree that all choices are good choices simply
>because choice is good in itself.
Of course not. But to say that you shouldn't give choice because
people might make a wrong one is disingenuous.


>But those [authoritarian countries] that come to their senses and
>seek to conduct trade and commerce in a similar manner to the
>capitalist democracies soon provide the same freedoms of labour and
>consumption that are essential to the workings of capitalism. And as
>far as prosperity goes, they don't seem to be doing too badly
>relative to the others.
I suppose you're pointing to the shining example of China? Not only
does it stand alone (IIRC), the seeming figures conceal many economic
distortions and much misery among normal Chinese people. Besides
which, they are a threat to the world (sabre rattling, endless
coverups ala SARS, reams of deceit in say providing statistics etc)


>this "democracy" is not based on political virtue; it is still the
>sham form that sees parliament as a tool for pushing my
>personal/class interests at the expense of others.
This is precisely how democracy works. Everyone pushes their own
interests, and this leads to a better situation then if, oh, a small
military junta decides to push their own interests at the expense of
the other 99.9999% of the country.


>if they are stymied by the system they accept that they have been
>beaten in a "fair game" and the "will of the nation" must prevail
>against their own.
So how is democracy unfair? Is it more fair for the King to impose his
divine right on everyone? It's better to have 40% of the people
unhappy than 99.999%.


>It is the spectre of Legitimacy dressed in a different garb, telling
>you that you must agree because you participated in the last round of
>elections, you had choice, you consented etc etc.
So from where would true Legitimacy come? Divine fiat? Hah!


>And many actually existing democracies, including the UK, aren't even
>of the bipartisan variety that I've described - they have a single
>dominant party that has captured the Centre and won't be budged until
>they destroy themselves. Like the Labour Party or the Barisan
>Nasional or the Indian National Congress or Japan's LDP or the PAP.
Last I checked, the Tories, Liberal Democrats, BJP and DPJ all had a
substantial number of seats in parliament. Hell, even PAS has 1/13
states and had 2/13. And perhaps you forget that most parties are not
monolithic wholes and contain factions, with people who dissent with
the party leader's line? Ergo the snap elections called in Japan?


>In practice, you only "get rid" of bad government once it's become
>completely unviable like the Tories in 1997 - or you get rid of
>fairly decent government every time because society is split down the
>middle and the vote easily goes either way to the Right or the Left.
>It's better than dictatorship or military junta, certainly, as far as
>stable transitions go - but I don't think the system is worthy of the
>claims that B is making. I think in practice it is much closer to
>the alternative model I described, that of corporate management.
Ah yes. Everyone is in cahoots. We reshuffle the seats to the same few
people. Or something like that. Except that we see different policies,
different people coming up and the like. Oh I forgot. They're all part
of the Grand Conspiracy to bring on the New World Order under the
Illuminati, and despite appearing to espouse different agendas and
policies, secretly they're all united in purpose! Watch out for the
black helicopters.


>B has very little to say on the subject, since he has expended
>much breath trying to make claims for the value of his system.
"Where ends are agreed, the only questions left are those of means,
and these are not political but technical, that is to say, capable of
being settled by experts or machines like arguments between engineers
or doctors."

Unfortunately, we were not agreed on the ends, so it is hardly
surprising that we did not move on to the means.


>B finds the issue of the historical origins of his system
>irrelevant; I find them relevant because they show that the elements
>of his system do not make up an organic, indivisible whole. Instead
>these elements arise piecemeal only as a result of the fulfilment of
>other necessary preconditions - and therefore they provide empirical
>material for a study of what is *necessary* to get to a stable,
>functioning democracy.
Hmm. Kind of sounds like Evolution to me. But we all know that's part
of the Evil Atheist Conspiracy, so pish posh.


>try to have elections in a country where these conditions don't
>prevail, like Zimbabwe in 1980, and you get a Robert Mugabe (who
>won't surrender power and resorts to pulling the racial revenge card
>to split the people and preserve his position).
On the other hand, don't have elections and we get everyone else in
Africa. Whee. Any Zimbabwe experts here to tell us how Robert managed
to do this?


>you can have a revolution that brings to power a sufficiently strong
>leadership with a firm commitment to liberal and democratic
>principles; two, you can have gradual top-down reform. I am highly
>averse to the former method because firstly, there's a lot of blood
>involved and secondly, very often the "democrats" (like Mr Mugabe)
>find that the temptation to abuse the large amount of power they
>amassed in the process of securing their position is too great.
Meanwhile, I am highly skeptical of the latter because people don't
want to relinquish power. As a corollary to what Hume realized a long
time ago, if you have all the power in the present system of
government, you are unlikely to want to democratise.


>As for Singapore, B has complained about how bad it is (relative
>to his ideal model) and mentioned one victim of the historical
>process of creating strong central government and economic prosperity
>in this country.
"We had to lock you up for 23 years because if not, we would have
anarchy and we'd be eating tapioca again like during the Japanese
occupation"

Non-sequitur.


>There are other victims - but that's the past, and it's not much use
>crying over spilt milk.
No, but it's very useful to remember it so your milk doesn't spoil in
the future.

What was it a wise man said? "He who controls the past commands the
future. He who commands the future conquers the past." Wait, no, that
wasn't it. I'll get back to you after I eat my fortune cookie.


>In fact the passing of that generation is itself (in some way) a
>condition for further change, a change already in progress on the
>academic front (as seen from the new papers on Singaporean history
>reassessing the Left of the 1950s and 60s).
These academics are real sneaky, publishing all this seditious
material which undermines nation building. Luckily the hoi polloi
never will read it, so everyone's happy.

>And in the meantime, I don't see the secret police dragging B
>away from his computer as he types his reply. =)
Ah, but there are more subtle ways to effect the same ends, as Ryan
Goh found out.