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Wednesday, October 19, 2022

Malays as Indigenous to Malaysia

"In October 2019, the Malay Dignity Congress, organized by a coalition of Malay political parties and academics and officiated by Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister at the time, was held in Kuala Lumpur. It was a controversial event and received heavy criticism from concerned citizens for what was perceived to be a racist agenda. Mahathir responded to his critics via his regular blog and Twitter posts. In it, he defended the meeting as filling a need the Malay community has for discussions on the question of Malay dignity and pointed out that other ethnic communities in Malaysia also regularly had their own gatherings and discussions without protest from the general public. In conclusion, he wrote,

It hurts me to think in their own country the indigenous people[emphasis added] are not supposed to have their own gatherings without being accused of being racist. And now of course I will be labelled a racist for writing this. (Mahathir 2019a)

The last part of his statement sparked a heated discussion among some of my Orang Asli acquaintances on social media. The Orang Asli are the aboriginal people of peninsular Malaysia and thus are Indigenous to the land...

Mahathir’s positioning of the Malays as ‘the indigenous people’ and the Orang Asli’s counter comments above give us a glimpse into the competing claims for the Indigenous slot in Malaysia, particularly in the context of peninsular Malaysia, the geographical focus of this paper...

This is not the first time Mahathir has claimed the Malays are the Indigenous people of Malaysia. In his book, The Malay Dilemma, published in 1970, Mahathir makes the case that the Malays were “the definitive” people of Malaysia because they were the first to establish a polity that is acknowledged internationally.

Also referenced in this conversation is the Parti Bersatu Pribumi Malaysia (Malaysian United Indigenous Party), a Malay-led political party founded by Mahathir in 2016 as part of his then political comeback. Many Orang Asli were unhappy with the use of the term ‘pribumi’ as they contended that the term should refer only to the Orang Asli or Orang Asal and not to the Malays. An Asli friend of mine pointed out that it is not just their position and name that are being taken away, but also their land. In Malaysia, much is at stake regarding claims to indigeneity as they are coupled with rights and privileges...

The terms Malay, Orang Asli, bumiputera, native, pribumi, Orang Asal and aborigine are all local concepts of ‘indigeneity’ that circulate and compete with one another in Malaysia...

Indigeneity in Malaysia and in many parts of Southeast Asia is not as clearly defined as in the Americas, Australia or New Zealand where there is a distinct native-settler dichotomy (Baird 2016, pp. 501–2; Erni 2008)...

The Malays position themselves as ‘natives’ of the land as a result of a colonial construct that made a distinction between Malays and the Chinese and Indians who migrated later, while, at the same time, the Orang Asli are acknowledged as the aboriginal peoples of the Malay Peninsula. ‘Aboriginal Peoples’, and later the Malay translation ‘Orang Asli’, is an administrative category that includes the many different aboriginal groups in peninsular Malaysia. In parallel, there are the terms ‘bumiputera’ (sons of the soil) and ‘pribumi’ (native or first to the land), which include the Malays, Orang Asli and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, while ‘Orang Asal’ (Indigenous Peoples), a newer organizing category stemming from the Indigenous movement in Malaysia, includes the Orang Asli of peninsular Malaysia and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, but not the Malays...

The politics of indigeneity continue to be the lynchpin of Malaysian politics and the foundation of state-formation narratives...

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the term ‘Indigenous’ was the subject of a heated debate within both academic and activist circles. Some scholars questioned the usefulness of such a category (Kuper 2003) and warned of the potential risks of subscribing to an essentialized identity (Conklin 1997; Conklin and Graham 1995; Li 2000)...

At the international level, the concept of ‘Indigenous’ is largely shaped by the experiences of countries in the Americas in the context of European invasion and colonization, also known as the ‘salt-water theory’ (Baird 2016, p. 501). In these countries, there is a defined (and, for some, continued) native-settler framework, with the state tracing its roots to the colonizing power. The situation in Southeast Asia, however, resonates more with that of Africa, where, as Dorothy Hodgson writes, “the contemporary lack of dominant colonial population converges with long histories of conquest, assimilation, migration, and movement to make the criteria for deciding who is ‘indigenous’ far murkier” (2002, p. 1037).

However, while anthropologists try to unpack the nuances and convergences of local politics and international Indigenous discourses, at the ground level, Indigenous and human rights activists have embraced the language of international Indigenous rights that is already ‘out there’ in full force (Hodgson 2002, p. 1037; Karlsson 2003, p. 416). While initially having to struggle to fit within an international discourse and the definition of ‘indigeneity’ as a concept (Hodgson 2002, p. 1038), Indigenous movements in Southeast Asia now play active roles at international meetings, even taking on important leadership roles. Forums and mechanisms, such as the UN and the UNDRIP in particular, have provided international space for Indigenous rights activism otherwise limited to their own countries (Baird 2016, 2019; Niezen 2003). Thus, even while Asian governments continue to deny or debate the definition of ‘Indigenous’, the international discourses of Indigenous rights feature prominently in local Indigenous activism and rights claims (Baird 2016; Nicholas et al. 2010; Subramaniam 2015)...

Tania Li’s concept of positioning, drawing from Stuart Hall, is useful in understanding the dynamics and varied politics of indigeneity in Malaysia. Li (2000) examines the different positioning in claims for what she refers to as the ‘tribal slot’. She writes,

a group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not natural or inevitable, but neither is it simply invented, adopted, or imposed. It is, rather, a positioning which draws upon historically sedimented practices, landscapes, and repertoires of meaning, and emerges through particular patterns of engagement and struggle. (Li 2000, p. 151)

... The politics of indigeneity in Malaysia needs to be understood within the context of the country’s plural society and communal politics. The total Malaysian population for 2019 was estimated at 32.9 million, with a breakdown of 69.3 per cent bumiputera, 22.8 per cent ethnic Chinese, 6.9 per cent ethnic Indians and 1.0 per cent Others (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2019). None of the above categories is homogenous; each is made up of multiple ethnic identities. The bumiputera category can be further divided into Malays, natives of Sabah and Sarawak, and the Orang Asli. The total percentage of the Orang Asal population (natives of Sabah and Sarawak plus Orang Asli) stands at 13.9 per cent (Nicholas 2020). The total number of Orang Asli in peninsular Malaysia comes to about 198,000, making up only 0.7 per cent of the Malaysian population (Nicholas 2020).

The term ‘Orang Asli’, which translates as ‘Original People’, is an administrative category that began to be officially used in the 1960s. It is a category that encompasses eighteenethnic subgroups, which are further categorized into three subgroups—Semang (Negrito), Senoi and Aboriginal Malay. Each group is associated with a specific geographical area or ‘ecological niches’ (Nicholas 2000, p. 60) and has their own distinct language and cultural practices. While heterogeneous and distinct, the different tribes share certain similar experiences and, through administrative and advocacy organization, take on the label ‘Orang Asli’ as a shared identity. The different groups do, however, primarily identify with their tribal identities, such as Temiar, Temuan or Semai. One of the commonalities of the different tribal groups is how their identities are tied to their natural environment (Nicholas 2000, pp. 32–33); another is their history of marginalization...

The Orang Asli are governed under the paternalistic Aboriginal Peoples Act of 1954, which positions them as wards of the state. The act includes a definition of who may be considered ‘aboriginal’ or Orang Asli. The state has control over Orang Asli land and territory; at best, they are defined as tenants-at-will on state land. This means that whenever the government wants the land for ‘development’ projects, the Orang Asli can be evicted, often without proper consultation or compensation for the land.

The Orang Asli score poorly on the socio-economic scale, with more than fifty per cent living below the poverty line (Idrus 2013, p. 269). Other social indicators, such as high school dropout rates, high infant mortality rates and malnutrition, point to the impoverished condition of the community (Idrus 2013, pp. 269–77).

Early post-Independence policy set out a goal for the “ultimate integration [of the Orang Asli] with the Malay section of the community” but outlined that “special measures should be adopted for the protection of the institution, customs, mode of life, persons, property and labour of the aborigine people” (Department of Information 1961, pp. 3, 5). However, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a strong push for the assimilation of Orang Asli into the Malay communities, largely through an Islamization policy (JHEOA 1983, p. 2). Some analysts suggested that the assimilation of Orang Asli into the Malay community strengthened the Malays’ claim as the Indigenous people of the land (Nah 2003).

As aboriginal people, the Orang Asli often face discrimination and are looked down upon as ‘backward’ by other Malaysians. For example, the term ‘Jakun’—a name for a specific Orang Aslisubgroup—is used colloquially as a derogatory term to denote someone who is ‘primitive’. The lack of land rights and self-determination are constant struggles faced by the Orang Asli in Malaysia, contributing to their poverty. The Orang Asli’s positioning as the aboriginal people and Indigenous does not entitle them to the same privileges as the Malays in their positioning as Indigenous.

The Orang Asli and the Malays have had a long history of connections...

Analysis of census categories and policy documents from the 1950s shows how the Orang Asli were sometimes aggregated with the Malays as ‘sons of the soil’ and at other times positioned as distinct and consequently denied the rights and entitlements the Malays enjoyed (Idrus 2011, pp. 109–10).

In the years leading to independence (1957) and in the early post-independence era, the 1950s and 1960s, Orang Asli claims for recognition as the true ‘sons of the soil’ were conveniently made invisible by Malay leaders, who publicly affirmed Orang Asli rights to be treated with equality, but positioned them as ‘one of the ethnic minorities’ rather than as ‘sons of the soil’. In the later post-independence era, having secured privileges for Malays (affirmed in the Federal Constitution) and with their position not actively challenged, Malay leaders drew sharper distinctions between Orang Asli and Malays (Idrus 2011, pp. 111–13). While identifying the Orang Asli as aboriginal peoples, Malay politicians argued that—as the first group that established an internationally recognized government and constituting the majority of the population—the Malays were the rightful Indigenous people of the land. This is exemplified by Mahathir Mohamad’s statement that was referred to earlier in this article. In his book The Malay Dilemma, Mahathir (1970, pp. 127, 133) wrote,

In Malaya, the Malays without doubt formed the first effective government. The Malay states have been internationally recognised since the beginning of Malayan history.... The aborigines were never accorded any such recognition, nor did they claim such recognition. There was no known aborigine government or aborigine state. Above all, at no time did they outnumber the Malays.... I contend that the Malays are the original or indigenous people of Malaya.

... There is, however, another configuration of indigeneity—bumiputera (‘sons of the soil’)—which places Malays, the Orang Asli and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak in the same slot. The term has been in circulation since before independence, denoting communities that had a long history of residence in Malaysia prior to the British colonial period. It gained currency in the 1950s as the country was preparing for independence from the British and negotiations on citizenship rights were in progress (Mason and Omar 2003, p. 2).

Aside from the Malays, the Orang Asli and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, the Thai ethnic group in Kelantan and Kedah and the Portuguese Eurasian community are also considered bumiputera. Chinese and Indians are excluded from this category as they are considered later migrants. In reality, though, there are Chinese and Indian families who can trace their ancestry to before the British colonial period, and there are also Malays who migrated to Malaysia post-independence. The Chinese Peranakan, for example, have been in peninsular Malaysia since the fifteenth century. Some of these smaller groupings have lobbied for bumiputera status, although thus far the acknowledgment seems limited to gaining entry to certain government financial schemes such as the Amanah Saham Bumiputera (Bumiputera Unit Trust).

Officially, the term ‘bumiputera’ began to appear in government documents in the 1960s. In peninsular Malaysia, the term was synonymous with being Malay Muslim (Andaya and Andaya 2001, p. 342). The Federal Constitution mentions special privileges for the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak in Article 153, in the form of “Reservations of quotas in respect of services, permits, etc. for Malays and the natives of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak”. This includes rights to central leadership positions in the government, as well as privileges such as quotas for business licences and jobs in the civil service.

The Orang Asli were not mentioned in Article 153. One possible reason was that the Orang Aslihad been historically categorized under the larger rubric of ‘Malayan race’ along with the Malays. Therefore, an argument could be made that the ‘Malay’ mentioned here included the Orang Asli(Hirschman 1987, p. 563). Others claim that the Orang Asli were intentionally left out from the list by the Malay-led government and made invisible in order to bolster Malay claims as the natives of peninsular Malaysia (Idrus 2011, pp. 109–10; Nah 2003)...

At times, bumiputera special privileges have worked to the detriment of the Orang Asli (Idrus 2013, p. 282). Many projects instituted during the New Economic Policy (1971–1990) created to uplift the bumiputera focused on land allocation and on converting forest lands into plantations for Malay farmers. As more and more large-scale plantations were developed, they encroached upon Orang Asli lands (Nicholas 2000, p. 114). Some communities retreated further into the forest, while others were resettled into villages closer to urban areas. The focus on smallholders also marginalized those Orang Asli who practised subsistence farming and shifting cultivation.

In the 1990s, the state began to use ‘bumiputera’ as a census category. In the 1991 and 2000 censuses, the Orang Asli were officially placed under the bumiputera category. The category was split into two subcategories of ‘Malays’ and ‘Other Bumiputera’ (‘Bumiputera Lain’), with Orang Asliplaced in the latter category. Administratively, Orang Asli are thus acknowledged as part of the bumiputera population and theoretically have access to the special privileges reserved for the bumiputera. In reality, many do not enjoy the same privileges as their Malay counterparts...

In 2007, the UNDRIP was passed by the UN General Assembly after two decades of negotiations, with Malaysia as one of the signatories. I was excited about this news as I had attended the UN Indigenous Peoples meeting a year earlier and was aware of the drawn-out drafting process and negotiations that had preceded the event. However, a long-time activist acquaintance wryly commented to me that the only reason the Malaysian government had signed the document was because they believed that the UNDRIP was for the Malays.

Several years later, a similar claim was made by the deputy director of Jabatan Kemajuan Orang Asli (Department of Orang Asli Development)—the state agency responsible for Orang Asli welfare—when pressed to explain the department’s lack of commitment to the declaration. He explained that the UNDRIP was not of concern to his department because the Indigenous group covered by the UNDRIP was the Malays. He explained that the Malays are the Indigenous people of Malaysia, while the Orang Asli are not,as they were categorized as ‘aboriginal people’. This statement was puzzling, especially coming from the deputy director who was himself Orang Asli. The widely accepted international definition described Indigenous peoples as those “having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies”, “consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies” and “form at present non-dominant sectors of society” (Martinez-Cobo 1987, cited in Niezen 2003, p. 20). Given this definition, it is the Orang Asli and not the Malays who would fit in this slot. In addition, the Malays had never made any claims for rights via the UNDRIP and were not involved in any of the earlier meetings and negotiations.

For the Orang Asli, the UNDRIP provided the language to claim their rights by invoking international commitment to the rights of Indigenous peoples. The claim that the UNDRIP was for the Malays has largely been ignored by the Orang Asal rights activists, as Malay groups have never in the past participated in the international Indigenous movement, whereas the Orang Asal (which include the Orang Asli and natives of Sabah and Sarawak) had actively participated in the movement and had lobbied for the UNDRIP. Moreover, while the UN has an open policy of self-identification, a commonly accepted definition for ‘Indigenous Peoples’ in the UNDRIP includes being part of the non-dominant society. The Malays do not fit into this definition...

The UNDRIP affirms Indigenous peoples’ ties to their land, their right to self-determination and the right to free and prior informed consent (FPIC)—rights that are currently limited for the Orang Asli in Malaysia...

The discourse on international Indigenous rights was also used in local court cases to invoke Malaysia’s commitment at the international level. In land claims cases, we see historical claims intersecting with those of newer international Indigenous rights. In a landmark Orang Asliland claims case (known as Sagong Tasi and Ors. v. the State of Selangor and Ors.), the defendants—the state and federal governments—argued that the Orang Asliplaintiffs could not claim customary rights because they were no longer practising a traditional way of life. The defendants’ strategy was to suggest that the Orang Asligroup had assimilated as Malays because they now spoke Malay, wore clothes like the Malays and in some cases had converted to Islam. The Orang Asli then had to prove that they were Indigenous enough to make claims to customary rights.

When Sagong Tasi, village elder and lead plaintiff in this case, was on the witness stand... he imagined saying to the Malay attorney representing the defendants, “You say we are the same, but put a monkey in front of us now and we will see who will eat it.”

Sagong’s comeback is significant. It certainly would have made a good counterpoint in court. It is a stereotype that Orang Asli eat monkeys, a taboo food item for Malays, who are predominantly Muslims. Sagong cleverly used this marker in making the point that the Orang Asli are indeed different from the Malays. Here the distinction between Malays and Orang Asli is important because of the different rights accorded to different categories of indigeneity. The government had claimed that the Orang Asli could not claim customary rights because they had become Malays. Yet, as Orang Asli,they had yet to begiven the right to self-determination and the right to be compensated for their land.

In this same case, the Orang Aslilegal team drew upon international precedent in making an argument for the rights of Orang Asli to customary land. Persuaded by authoritative cases from Australia, Canada, the United States, South Africa and Nigeria, the Malaysian High Court made history by awarding native titles to the community...

K: “Sultan Samad Jugra, he came later, after our people settled here.... He was from the pirate clan.”

M: “Our people did not even know there was a Sultan. We were here long ago, wearing clothes made of bark, before the Malays came wearing their tanjak [head wrap made of cloth]. We were here long before the Bugis people came.”

The reference to “pirate clan” refers to the Bugis origins of the present Selangor royal family. The Bugis originated from the southwest district of Celebes and they traded and settled in the ports of Java, Borneo, Malaya and Sumatra (Gullick 1960, p. 16). Dutch military action in Celebes at the end of the seventeenth century prompted many to migrate to the western coast of the Malay Peninsula (Gullick 1960, p. 16). The early Bugis settlers of Selangor were known as excellent traders and fierce warriors. Some were also known as pirates and slave traders.

Here, the Orang Asli were countering the Malays’ ‘first to the land’ claims by telling their own version of the history of the land. They maintained that they had been there before the sultan and therefore had customary rights to the land. Their claim to customary rights was eventually recognized by the Federal Court, which ruled in favour of the Temuan Orang Asli, making this a landmark decision."

--- Competing for the ‘Indigenous’ Slot / Rusaslina Idrus

This is the brown version of Terra Nullius. Ironically, the same logic could be used to disinherit other "indigenous" peoples.

Of course, the Malay supremacist will have some cope about how Malays are the true indigenous people.

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