"The 1964 racial riots are a prominent event in Singapore's history. They are often cited officially but rarely discussed by the Singapore community. This paper examines the riots from the perspective of a sociology of collective memories. A comparison of official and popular memories reveals a number of contrasts in the interpretations placed on these events by different groups. An official interpretation of the memory of the riots is disseminated to the younger generation through the media and education, and used to justify and legitimize the ideology of multiracialism and its social policies. Older people's memories give rise to more varied interpretations...
A nation is a collective group whose members' individual memories are tied up with the rest of the community. However, on this level, the articulation of what is to be remembered belongs to the political leaders and intellectual elites who bring their personal memories and interpretations to bear heavily on the social memories of Singaporeans. Thus within Singapore, the dominant discourse on the riots provides the official or "national" memory (Fentress and Wickham, 1992:127). Memories can therefore be re constructed or manipulated, or used as a tool against internal or external opponents. In Singapore, "national" memory is seldom contested openly by social groups. It is transmitted through educational insdtutions and the media and used to entrench institutional interests and ideology. National memory articulated through dominant discourses is imposed from the rul ing elite down to the general population through private or public means. These conceptions of the past are linear and chronological leading even tually to a legitimate present situation. The dominant memory can become hegemonic and totalizing such that alternative memories are regarded as irrelevant, inaccurate and at times even illegitimate. This subjugation of alternative memories depends on how tolerant the national culture can be and the degree to which it can be challenged. Individuals or social groups can support or challenge public representations of the past because these will either "guarantee their identity or deny its significance" (Tonkin, 1992:10). In Singapore, the dominant memory of the riots serves to define the identity of a multiracial society...
In each of these [official] discourses, the narrative structure of the riots in national memory has remained the same. The selection and ordering of events creates a moral order. Chronology can therefore be seen as a tool used by historians to construct a timeline to connect and compare the sequence of events. This in turn can direct thought, since the narrative structure suggests that events are causally connected. The riots are presented as being a result of political tension because of racial issues raised by politicians, and the racial divisions existing within the population. This then becomes a factor in the Separation from Malaysia. The moral drawn is that we need interracial harmony, or rioting and chaos will be the inevitable end. This moral story is used by the political elite to discipline the population. In the official memory, the narrators lend their authority to the account, and the moral precedent built in to it legitimates the ideology supported by the teller...
Many of my informants did not experience any fighting or rioting at all because they lived in calm areas and carried on their lives as normal. For them the rioting seemed far and removed from their every day life...
Of the 23 informants who lived through this period, 16 were unaffected by the riots because their residences were calm and peaceful. The only fear was that outsiders would enter their kampong and pick a fight with them. Thus, contrary to official discourse, which claimed widespread fighting, the popular discourse showed otherwise. Violent clashes only occurred in areas near the precipitating event
The Malays as a collective ethnic group believed that the riots were not "racial" to begin with. Contrary to the official memory, it began as a "religious" riot because it occurred during "one of the biggest religious festivals" in the Muslim calendar...
Many Malay informants also observed that the Muslim procession was a mix of a majority of Malays and Indians and perhaps some Chinese and thus could not have been racially motivated. Collectively they expressed a sense of loss, since the procession was subsequently banned because of the riots...
Although they believed it was the Chinese who initiated the riots, some thought they were Chinese gangsters, belonging to Secret Societies (SS), taking advantage of the chaotic situation to initiate fights with rival SS members, leading to skirmishes between Chinese and Malay youth gangs in certain parts of the island. Many believed that the local community was not involved...
Informants who read widely or held civil service jobs believed that the riots could be politically motivated due to the internal politics between the two opposing parties, PAP and UMNO, and the on-going Indonesian Confrontation. Mr Buang, a civil servant, believed it was "mainly motivated by political parties", but was unsure which party was the instigator...
Others thought Indonesian agents instigated the riots and shifted the blame onto the Chinese. This was the opinion of Mr Awang, a former police officer, who obtained his information from newspapers he read during and after the riots, and from discussions with his colleagues...
The riots did leave the Malay informants initially angry at the Chinese. In some kampong, this affected their relationships and interactions with one another. However these feelings did not last long when they realized that there could be other causes of the riots:
Sure angry lah, how can the Chinese fellow throw stones, kill these fellow, do these things. But after that nothing lah relationship the same. (Mr Farid)
Mr Awang, who saw himself as part of the collective group of Malays in Singapore, expressed this anger in a collective mode rather than an individual one:
Everybody you know. Majority of Malays all angry, but 1964 was a small misunderstanding between Malay and Chinese. Most of the villages in Singapore were living peacefully together.
... Those informants who read widely or who held government occupations, and were in touch with the political scene of that time, tended to attribute the cause of the riots to the political situation...
Contrary to selective official memory, which views the 1964 racial riots as Singapore's worst riots, the Malay informants remember the Nadra riots as bigger. The Nadra riots were recalled as a significant occasion on which they had stood and fought for their religion. Religion is of greater importance in the Malay construction of identity than is typical for other groups. Islam evokes such deep feelings in the community that all of them felt involved...
As we have seen, the Nadra riots were not emphasized in the official dis course examined thus far, perhaps because, having a religious rather than a racial colouring, they are perceived to be less useful in a narrative devoted to emphasizing the importance of ethnic harmony.
In contrast, all my Chinese informants, especially those who witnessed frightening episodes, believed that the Malays were responsible for starting the riots...
Mr Goh uses the same political discourse as Mr Lim to explain the reason for the instigation of the riots. Their memories replicate the national memory...
The Indian informants, on the other hand, seem marginal to the riots. They had very vague memories and were unable to recollect much...
Within the dominant memory, mutual antagonism, fear and hatred prevailed between ethnic groups. The spectre of the racial riots is used often in the state's discourse to justify and legitimate ideology and policies. In order for it to be effective, memories have to evoke scenes of violence and fighting. However, within popular memory, helpfulness and co-operation is a recurring theme. In ethnically mixed settlements, the riots served to "gel" the two races together to protect their own kampong. My informants recollect many instances of people living in harmony. The fact that this theme runs so consistently throughout the popular discourse testifies that this was a common phenomenon during the riots...
The official memory of the riots portrays a one-sided picture of chaos, violence and fighting between the Malays and the Chinese over the entire island, while popular memory shows otherwise. The fighting and rioting were confined to areas adjoining Geylang Serai. Many of the informants pointed out that sporadic incidents did occur in other parts of the island but were only small skirmishes and many other parts were unaffected. In contrast to official memory, which represents the two races living in fear of one another, many informants relate living harmoniously and helping one another...
Through discursive practices, the 1964 riots have evolved as a dis cursive object. Since their occurrence, they have been discussed by ordinary people, the media and the state. The riots as a discursive object is embedded in a discourse of multiracialism. It is invoked by the government, both to raise racial awareness and to justify social policies. The re presentations of the memories of the riots as racial can be associated with the process of state and nation building, within which "political rhetoric" depends on the past as a "legitimation device" for political action (Fentress and Wickham, 1992:132). Once this rhetorical discourse is in place, it affects present actions, and conditions future activity as well. The past is a "resource to deploy, to support a case or assert a claim" (Tonkin, 1992:1)...
he government has also used the riots to justify social policies. In 1989, the government was concerned that certain minority groups were forming concentrations in certain estates. The Minister for National Development explained that these "enclaves will become seedbeds for communal agitation" (Straits Times, 7 January 1989). The spectre of the riots was used to rationalize the policy of ethnic quo tas for each estate in this discourse on race relations. There is a prevalent belief that spatial segregation would lead to racial conflicts similar to the 1964 riots (Hill and Lian, 1995:116). Framed in such a manner, the riots are decontextualized and over-simplified. The existence of ethnic enclaves need not lead automatically to antagonism and riots...
Although the older generation, having been through the riots, have their personal memories, which at times contradict national memories, this contradiction is confined to the private arena due to the state's hegemonic control over the public sphere. Their statements reflect this dilemma. On the one hand, they emphasized that: "Riots will never happen again" (Mrs Prabalakshmi); "Life is so secure now, who wants to cause trouble and destroy all we have today?" (Mr Cheong); or "Today people more educated, how to happen again?" (Mr Farid). On the other hand, being embedded within the multiracial discourse, they contradictorily state that racial harmony and tolerance is important because: "Racial issues so sensitive, someone want to take advantage can easily spark it off" (Mr Awang); "We must be sensitive" (Mr Cheong); or "We will face riots days again" (Mr Goh)...
When the second generation were asked which events in Singapore's history they considered important, none included the 1964 riots... most of their historical memory is formed through additional information through the latest educational programme (National Education), from books, or through television programmes. Most were also unable to furnish further details of the events that unfolded prior to or after the riots. None could discuss political or economic issues in 1964, or could give a well-defined account of what had happened in the riots...
Although students have gone through these activities, how much is retained in their memory is debatable. One of my informants commented that "it was all very boring. Some of us skip the lectures lah" (Karen). Jamil was not at all interested: "I didn't pay attention, so I can't remember what they said". For Peter, "I forgot already ah, can't remem ber what it is all about." However, the discourse only requires the riots to be remembered factually as race riots and as a natural consequence of interracial disharmony. The images that students have retained, either from the media or their exposure to the NE programme, are suitably lurid:
It's not out of the question that riots will come again. (Norlina)
Anarchy, chaos everywhere, homeless people, burning house. (Melissa)
If a riot occurs, the government will step in with their tanks. (Anita)
These extreme images are a contrast to the older generation's popular memories of the riots being localized and peaceful relations prevailing. Thus the NE programme serves to further disperse statements on the 1964 riots, and make them more effective and powerful tools for justifying and legitimating state initiatives"
In other words, maybe the 'race riots' weren't really race riots, and really, they didn't threaten to destroy Singapore.
