In which Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952), Turner v. Williams (1904), Trump v. Hawaii (2018) and Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972) are cited in affirming that deporting non-citizens for their views does not violate the First Amendment or otherwise violate their rights (not to mention how even if he were a citizen, he would still not be in the clear):
"Petitioner Mahmoud Khalil acted as a lead negotiator and spokesperson for Columbia University-based student groups that espoused support for Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”). Petitioner facilitated and advocated on behalf of students who took over buildings and committed extensive violent acts, including destruction of property, criminal possession of a weapon, false imprisonment, and others. Petitioner has advocated for “resistance by any means necessary,” a euphemism for engaging in violence against innocent civilians to achieve a political objective—namely, the destruction of the State of Israel...
Petitioner’s deportation is amply supported by the law.
First, the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) supports petitioner’s deportation and does not contain a First Amendment exception. Because noncitizens do not enjoy the same First Amendment rights as citizens, Petitioner’s First Amendment claims are subject to only the “facially legitimate and bona fide” standard of review, a highly deferential standard deeming that courts may not look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification’ against the asserted constitutional interests of U.S. citizens.
Second, even if strict scrutiny applies, the Government amply satisfies that standard because the INA’s speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest in national security. The INA’s speech restrictions constitute content-based restrictions, not viewpoint-based restrictions. The INA’s limitations on speech supporting terrorist organizations satisfies a compelling government interest.
Third, the INA was designed to ensure that individuals like Petitioner could not reap the benefits of American residency while subverting important foreign policy and other values. Espousing support for terrorist organizations and leading groups of students who violated a slew of laws constitutes impermissible conduct for citizens and noncitizens alike. Petitioner’s conduct violated the Anti-Terrorism Act, a provision that would apply to him whether he was a citizen or not...
The Government cites 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) as its basis for removing Petitioner. See Resp. Opp. to Motion for P.I. (ECF No. 156 at 4). This provision gives the Secretary of State the power to order the deportation of an alien if “the Secretary of State has reasonable ground to believe [that Petitioner’s presence or activities in the United States] would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences. . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i). This section incorporates by reference the exception found in Section 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii), which ordinarily governs exclusion of aliens outside the United States and makes it equally applicable to deportations under Section 1227.
The exception in Section 1182 (sometimes referred to in part as the “Foreign Policy Bar”) prevents the Government from refusing entry or deporting an alien “because of [an] alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally determines that the alien’s admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign policy interest.”... Since the Government relies upon the Secretary’s determination for its action, the 1182 exception is simply inapplicable...
It is well-established that citizens and noncitizens do not enjoy legal parity.
Under our law, the alien in several respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, but in others has never been conceded legal parity with the citizen. Most importantly, to protract this ambiguous status within the country is not his right but is a matter of permission and tolerance. The Government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this Court since the question first arose.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 702 (2018) (recognizing the inherent power of the “Government’s political departments” to admit or exclude foreign nationals, because these types of questions are “largely immune from judicial control.”...
Speech restrictions are no exception to this rule. The fact that Petitioner is subject to heightened speech restrictions as compared to a naturalized U.S. citizen has been continually recognized by the courts in varying context for more than 100 years. The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that U.S. residents with varying immigration statuses can be subject to varying degrees of First Amendment protection to serve compelling government interests. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 420-22 (2010)...
Turner is a particularly informative case. In Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 293 (1904), the Supreme Court affirmed that the First Amendment is no bar to the deportation of an alien. The Court in Turner considered whether the government could deport alien John Turner because of his anarchist beliefs and advocacy for the violent overthrow of government...
The principles elucidated in Turner have stood the test of time. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court again explored the reach of the Executive’s power in matters relating to national security and immigration...
Mandel—as overwhelmingly approved of in Hawaii—articulated the sweeping power of the executive as applicable to both denials of entry and deportations. Mandel, 408 U.S. 766 (relying on the deportation case Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531-33 (1954)) (“Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. . . . [T]he formulation of these policies is entrusted to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . .”))...
Furthermore, the language of Hawaii itself targets its holding to immigration law more broadly, not simply entry, when citing approvingly multiple cases that either address or make reference to the broad power of either Congress or the Executive (i.e. the political branches) to deport aliens...
Finally, the construction of the INA itself incorporates the statutory reasons for denying entry as suitable reasons for deportation...
The Secretary of State, in his discretion, determined that Petitioner remining in the United States was adverse to American foreign policy interests. This Court cannot, therefore, “look behind” the Government’s decision to exercise its discretion to remove Petitioner, which is based on facially legitimate and bona fide foreign policy concerns. This court, therefore, may not weigh the Government’s justification for removing Petitioner against any First Amendment concerns.
As such, the fact that Petitioner is subject to more stringent speech restrictions than a U.S. citizen does not raise, and has never raised, a serious First Amendment issue. Petitioner’s removal is constitutional.
Even if the Court were to apply the same standard that it would to a U.S. citizen, requiring a strict scrutiny analysis, the INA’s speech prohibitions would still be constitutional because they are supported by a compelling government interest.
The INA rules in question survive strict scrutiny because they are narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s compelling interest in national security. The INA permits deportation of an alien based on his endorsement, espousal, or persuasion of others to endorse or espouse terrorist activities or support a terrorist organization, or his role as a representative or spokesperson for an organization that endorses or espouses terrorist activity...
The INA considers support for any terrorist organization as grounds for deportation or exclusion, with no consideration of what the terrorist group believes, endorses, or seeks to accomplish...
To survive strict scrutiny, a regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Unlike the anarchist views held by Mr. Turner, see supra at 7, no speculation is required as to what the impact of Petitioner’s speech or political beliefs might be. Petitioner’s actions have already proven dangerous to the well-being of the American public by leading a radical, pro-terrorist movement that has committed unlawful actions on college campuses throughout the United States, provoking a nationwide swell of support within the U.S. for the terrorist acts committed by Hamas on October 7, and creating a hostile environment for Jewish and Israeli students at Columbia University and elsewhere.
Notably, the protests and encampments at Columbia University acted as the model for many other college campuses. The Columbia protests were organized by at least two terror- supporting groups, including Students for Justice in Palestine (“SJP”) and Columbia University Apartheid Divest (“CUAD”). Petitioner was a self-described leader of these groups and the lead negotiator for the groups and their “demands” during the April 2024 Gaza Solidarity Encampment (“Encampment”). (ECF No. 162 at ¶ 1). His actions during the Encampment and its subsequent impacts put the dangers of Petitioner’s presence in the United States on full display. See, e.g., infra at Section II. If the Government has a compelling governmental interest in removing aliens like Mr. Turner, who generally oppose all organized government, it certainly has a much greater interest in removing Petitioner, who has led and represented groups that endorse and espouse terrorism and played a central role in persuading members of the American public to endorse and espouse the same, while also calling for the “total eradication of Western civilization.”...
As it relates to the government’s invocation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i) as its basis for removing Petitioner, it is hard to imagine a greater foreign policy interest than not allowing an organization literally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department to gain a solid foothold in our country. But Petitioner’s speech would be unlawful even if he were a citizen.
Even if Petitioner were a citizen, his speech would still violate the law. The First Amendment is not absolute, and all residents of the United States–including naturalized citizens– are subject to speech restrictions. For example, even a citizen who engages in advocacy in coordination with or provides material support to terrorist organizations can be subject to criminal penalties. See generally, Holder, 561 U.S. at 45; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)-(b) (creates civil and criminal penalties for providing “material support” to terrorist organizations). There is also compelling reason to believe that Petitioner and the student groups he led, collaborated directly with Hamas, knowingly participated in Hamas’ global propaganda campaign, and had advance knowledge of Hamas’ plans to commit mass murder on October 7. See generally, Haggai et al v. Kiswani et al, 25-02400 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 24, 2025), Complaint (ECF No. 1) (alleging Columbia SJP, CUAD, and affiliated groups coordinated with Hamas and its affiliates prior to October 7 and take direct instructions from Hamas regarding the spread of pro-Hamas and pro- terror propaganda in the United States in furtherance of Hamas’ stated goals). If true, these allegations likely violate the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2), which provides grounds for imprisonment of up to 20 years (or life, in some cases) and fines of up to $250,000. Therefore, Petitioner’s speech would not be constitutionally protected even if he were a naturalized citizen. Petitioner’s actions are exactly the sort that the INA seeks to restrict...
Aside from making their support for Hamas abundantly clear with chants of “Hamas we love you,” “we are all Hamas,” and “long live Hamas,” the coalition of student groups obstructed campus operations, and engaged in all manner of illegal activity, including trespass, assault, vandalism, robbery, destruction of property, arson, criminal possession of a weapon, burglary, false imprisonment and intimidation. Petitioner was one of their leaders and acted as their representative and spokesperson. Dozens of his followers were arrested for committing crimes...
In addition to universities and the UNRWA, Hamas has successfully gained influence in some corners of the non-profit world and news media, such as the Washington State-based “news” service known as the Palestine Chronicle. As detailed in a lawsuit brought by three former hostages of the October 7 attack, an employee of the Palestine Chronicle (employed since 2019) is alleged to have personally held at least three hostages during this time, worked directly with Hamas, and published pro-Hamas propaganda through the Palestine Chronicle while actively coordinating with his affiliates in the media and on college campuses... One of the freed hostages has reported that during his captivity Hamas would brag to him about their operatives on American campuses.
Petitioner’s employment by UNRWA is not a benign indicator of his desire to provide aid to struggling Palestinian civilians. Rather, it is an indicator of his long-term relationship and comfort with Hamas and its terroristic ideologies, which undoubtedly endanger national security and the fabric of American civil society...
Petitioner, through his leadership of CUAD and full-throated support for the “Palestinian resistance” by “any means necessary” has openly endorsed terrorist activity and sought to persuade others to do the same. When SJP published a letter affirming their ardent support of the October 7th attack, Petitioner was one of their leaders. When members of the Encampment shouted, “we are Hamas,” “Hamas we love you,” “burn Tel Aviv to the ground,” and shouted at their Jewish classmates, “the 7th of October will be every day for you,” Petitioner was their spokesperson. There is no question that Petitioner’s speech and conduct render him removable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 and 1227."
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