GRENZELOZE VERZORGINGSSTAAT: DE GEVOLGEN VAN IMMIGRATIEVOOR DE OVERHEIDSFINANCIËN (translated by Google from Dutch as "BORDERLESS STATE OF SERVICE: THE EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION ON PUBLIC FINANCES") has a very convenient English summary:
"The report“Borderless welfare state”deals with the consequences of immigration for Dutchpublic finances. It answers the following questions:
•What are the fiscal costs and benefits of immigration by migration motive (labour, study, asylum and family migration) and by region of origin?
•To what extent can immigration provide a solution to the ageing population in the Netherlands?
The current report is an update of the Public Sector chapter of the report Immigration and the Dutch Economy(2003) by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Both reports deploy the method of generational accounting to calculate the net contribution–revenues minus expenses–of immigrantsto public finances, measured from the moment of their immigration to the time of repatriation or death. This net contribution is the key concept of the current study.
The study uses microdatafrom 2016 provided by Statistics Netherlands. These are very detailed, anonymized data of all 17 million Dutch residents, including about two million people with a first-generation migration background and almost two million people with a second-generation migration background.
Total costs of immigration
The rapid pace of immigration into the Netherlands has greatly increased the Dutch population, but not the sustainability of the Dutch welfare state. Of the 17 million Dutch inhabitants at the end of 2019, 13% were born abroad (first generation) and 11% were children of immigrants (second generation). Currently, per capita expenditures on immigrants are significantly higher than on indigenous people in areas such as education, social security and benefits. Moreover, immigrants pay fewer taxes and social security premiums, which further lowers their net fiscal contribution...
The total net costsfor the Dutch public sector of immigration in the period 1995-2019 averaged €17billion per year, with a peak of €32 billion in 2016 due to the2015 ‘refugee crisis’.By comparison, the Dutch government also spent roughly €30 billion on education in 2016. As for totals, the total costs of immigration over the period 1995-2019 amounted to €400 billion. To put that into perspective: these government expenditures have the same order of magnitude as the total Dutch natural gas revenues at €400 billion from the start of extraction until 2019...
As regards the net contribution of immigrants to public finances, there are substantial differences between groups with different migration motives as registered by the Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). Only labour migration generates a positive net contribution of, on average, €125,000 per immigrant. Study migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of €75,000. Family migration shows, on average, a negative net contribution of about €275,000 per immigrant. Asylum migration shows a negative figure as well, amounting to an average of €475,000 per immigrant.
There are also considerable differences by region of origin. On average, Western immigrants make a positive contribution of €25,000, while non-western immigrants cost nearly €275,000. Within the categories Western and non-Western there is, however, much variation.
Immigration from most Western regions has a positive fiscal impact.Immigrants from Japan, North America, Oceania, the British Isles, Scandinavia, and Switzerland, in particular, make a significant positive contribution of roughly €200,000 per immigrant. Immigration from Central and Eastern EU-member costs about €50,000. Immigration from former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union mainly concerns asylum seekers, who make a much larger negative contribution of €150,000.
Immigration from non-Western regions is usually unfavourable for public finances. This applies especially to the areas of origin Caribbean, West-Asia, Turkey and North, Central and West Africa with net costsaround ranging from €200,000 to €400,000 per immigrant, and Morocco, the Horn of Africa and Sudan with net cost of €550,000to €600.000 per immigrant... By way of comparison: an average Dutch native is roughly ‘budget-neutral over’ his or her life.
For all migration motives, Western immigrants seem to ‘perform better’ than non-Western immigrants. The difference is approximately €125,000 for labour and study migrants, and €250,000 for asylum and family migrants.
In isolation, only two categories seem favourable for Dutch public finances; labour migration from western countries (except Central and Eastern European countries), Asia (except the Middle-East) and Latin America, as well as study migration from the EU. All other forms of immigration are at best budget-neutral or have a considerable negative fiscal impact. The highest net costs apply to asylum migration from Africa. It should be noted that study and labour immigration usually comes with family migration, which may have a considerable negative impact on the combined net contribution...
For Dutch residents without a migration background (native Dutch), the costs and benefits are roughly in balance. In other words: they are approximate ‘budget-neutral’. The effect on public finances of persons with a second-generation background who are well-integrated – i.e. with a level of education and labour market performance very similar to natives – is therefore also about budget-neutral.
Migrant groups of which the first generation yields substantial net benefits usually do not show the same outcome for the second-generation. That generation – although well-integrated – is usually roughly budget-neutral.
Migrant groups of which the first generation has a considerable negative net contribution, usually continue into a second generation that also has a negative or, at best, approximately budget-neutral contribution.For those groups, the net present value of the net contribution of future generations will not offset the costs for the first generation. The quite common idea that ‘things will change for the better in future generations’ therefore, does not apply when it comes to the costs and benefits of immigrants.
There is a substantial correlation between net lifetime contribution and educational attainment, ranging from –€400,000 for immigrants with at most primary education to +€ 300,000 for immigrants with a master degree. Furthermore, a robust correlation exists between net contribution and scores on the so-called ‘Cito test’, a 50-point student assessmentscale for primary education. For natives, lifetime net contributions range from roughly –€400,000 for the lowest Cito score to +€300,000 for the highest Cito score. For people with a second generation migration background, a similar correlation exists, though at a considerably lower level.
There are considerable differences in Cito scores between regions of origin and also between migration motives...
Like many Western nations, The Netherlands has an ageing population...
In line with the literature, this study found that solving dejuvenation by immigration resembles a pyramid or Ponzi scheme. A simulation shows that ever-increasing numbers of immigrants are needed to keep the Dutch grey pressure at the 2020 level. This results in significant population growth: 35 million inhabitants by the year 2060, 75 million at the end of this century, and half a billion by the year 2200.
Immigration does not provide a stable solution to population ageing because the underlying problems of low fertility and dejuvenation are not resolved. On average, fertility of immigrants is below the replacement level as well, partly because women from high fertility groups adjust their fertility downwards over time, and partly because immigrants from most countries in the Americas, Europe and Eastern Asia already have low fertility rates...
A simulation shows that closing a permanent financial gap in public finances of 2.5% of gross domestic product, by admitting labour migrants with high economic potential, would lead to additional population growth of 7.2 million inhabitants in the period 2020-2080. In addition, mass recruitment of high-potential migrants may prove difficult in practice, as most high net contributors currently come from countries that are themselves grappling with a rapidly aging population and/or trying to attract highly skilled immigrants...
A less negative, or a positive fiscal impact of immigration can be attained, but requires a fundamental policy change. The present study calculates a restrictive scenario, in which labour migration mainly originates from Western countries (except Central andEastern Europe), Latin America and Asia (except the Middle East), in which there is also a 50% reduction in family migration and a 90% reduction in asylum migration.This scenario is highly selective compared to the current situation and requires changes in international treaties, such as the UN Refugee Convention. Nevertheless,even then, immigration is only about budget-neutral.
Policy implications
The net costs of immigration to the government are considerable, and projections show they will consume a steadily increasing portion of the annual government budget. These costs are mainly due to redistribution through the welfare state. Continuation of the current level of immigration and current arrangements of the welfare state increases pressure on public finances. Downsizing the welfare state and/or curtailment of immigration will then be inevitable...
Nowadays, the consequences for public finances hardly play a role in policy decisions on immigration...
The Dutch government has not published data on net contribu-tions to public finances of migrants since 2003.We can only guess the reasons for this...
Perspective
Immigrants that make on average a significantly negative contribution to Dutch public finances are mainly those who exercise the right to asylum, especially if they come from Africa and the Middle East. The latest UN population forecast shows that the total population in these areas will increase from 1.6 billion to 4.7 billion by the end of this century. It is not implausible that the migration potential will at least keep pace.Migration pressure, in particular on the welfare states in North-Western Europe, will therefore increase to an unprecedented degree. This raises the question of whether maintaining the open-ended arrangement enshrined in the existing legal framework is a realistic option under these circumstances.
The current cabinet recently indicated to the House of Representatives how it views the existing legal framework. This was inresponse to a report on an “investigation into the question of whether, and if so how, the 1951 Refugee Convention can be updated to provide a sustainable legal framework for the international asylum policy of the future”. This response shows thatthe Dutch cabinet wants tomaintainthe existing legal framework for asylum migration – despite the large-scale abuse identified by the cabinet. The calculations in this report leave no doubt about what thismeans in the long term: increasing pressure on public finances and ultimately the end of the welfare state as we know it today. A choice for the current legal framework is, therefore, implicitly a choice against the welfare state."
No doubt the authors will be slammed (at least by Anglos) as far-right white supremacists: the photo of ostriches with one flipping the bird suggests that the authors know their findings will piss people off. This even though Eastern European (i.e. white) migration is also found to have a negative fiscal impact. Of course, Japanese having a positive discal impact doesn't count since Asians are white-adjacent.
Perhaps the best indicator of late capitalism is really harmful virtue signalling.
