Translated by Google:
Islamism in France Is Becoming an Electoral Issue - La Nuova Bussola Quotidiana (L'Islamismo in Francia sta diventando un problema elettorale)
A
lengthy report from the Élysée reconstructs Islam's political
strategies in France and the role played by institutional figures. And
as the local elections approach, there are fears that the community vote
will be exploited to turn the Muslim vote into an electoral lever.
Khaled Meshaal, the head of Hamas, speaks from afar, but with the air of someone observing a map slowly taking shape. In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera in early December, the leader of the Palestinian terrorist organization indulged in a boast that sounded less like a provocation and more like a diagnosis: "The Palestinian cause," he said, "has entered the minds of young Europeans and Americans," becoming a " new division of the resistance " that fights not in tunnels or along borders, but "in the streets, among young people, on university campuses, in political parties; there, the Palestinian cause has achieved great results." These words find unexpected support in the work of the French Parliament, which has just published its report on Islamism in the Republic .
For over a decade, Paris has been under constant pressure from a relentless Islamic terrorism and an Islamism that dictates the law in various contexts. This scenario is further corroborated by the publication of two investigative books— Omar Youssef Souleimane's "Accomplices of Evil" and Nora Bussigny's "The New Anti-Semites: An Investigation by an Infiltrator into the Ranks of the Far Left" —which have shed light on Islamist entryism into the French political class and have contributed to making an institutional response unavoidable. The Elysée Palace has decided to take a formal step: convening a parliamentary commission of inquiry to determine the existence and nature of the links between political Islamism and left-wing parties.
Six months of work under pressure , punctuated by closed hearings, personal threats, and a climate of constant tension, have led the French parliamentary commission to an unambiguous conclusion: the terrorist threat has not receded, and political Islamism continues to expand along less visible but highly dangerous lines. Thirty witnesses, including three researchers and two journalists, requested a closed-door hearing, fearing for their safety. La France Insoumise and Les Écologistes (The Greens) are the only two parties cited, and their connections, ambiguities, and similarities raise disturbing questions.
The 650-page report reconstructs in great detail the political strategies of Islam in France and the role played by institutional figures. "Political Islam is not a fantasy, it is not an abstraction, but a real, documented, and visible threat," declared the investigation's rapporteur, Matthieu Bloch . "It has a legalistic face and a violent one." And with the municipal elections approaching, the report warns of the potential exploitation of the community vote. "These consultations," it states, "could offer Islamists the opportunity to turn the Muslim vote into an electoral lever."
On the political level, the report goes beyond diagnosis : it records facts. Several radical imams have openly called for voting for La France Insoumise (Insubordinate France ). This signal reinforces the idea of an electoral unity that is now explicit, at least in some areas. The testimonies of the prefects of the major metropolitan areas, electoral strongholds of LFI, are among the most revealing. From the Rhône comes a clear statement: two party members are using an anti-colonial discourse aimed at portraying Islam and Muslim communities as systemic victims, exploiting these issues for political purposes. This stance, the report warns, makes LFI a linchpin of Islamist infiltration.
The cities of Valenciennes, Douchy-les-Mines, and Colombes are cited as case studies of a similar dynamic: the progressive infiltration of Islamist networks into the local political fabric, through formally legal but politically destabilizing mechanisms. According to the commission, three main trends can be observed in these cities. The first concerns the proven presence of militants or sympathizers of political Islamism within electoral lists and municipal consultative bodies, capable of influencing votes, resolutions, and administrative priorities.
The second concerns a targeted mobilization of the community vote , especially in neighborhoods with a high Muslim population, where identity claims—from places of worship to "cultural" associations, even symbolic concessions—are used as a lever for political exchange to transform a religious constituency into a disciplined electorate. The third direction is represented by a network of formally civic associations that act as a link between religious activism and local politics: it is in this gray area, the commission emphasizes, that Islamism takes on its "legalistic" form, exploiting the rules of the state to consolidate influence and legitimacy.
The systematic courting of Islamic associations, the defense of the headscarf in schools as a symbol of identity, the inflated use of the accusation of Islamophobia against those who criticize fundamentalism, the sacralization of immigration as a political dogma: everything has become a bargaining chip for a handful of votes.
These elements overlap with what Céline Berthon , head of the General Directorate for Internal Security, highlighted: "Not only the 2025 attacks and the five foiled plots, but also evidence of a strong presence of Islamism in other forms that undermine national cohesion: separatism and one of its manifestations, infiltration." This alarm was confirmed by Bertrand Chamoulaud, director of territorial intelligence , who requested a closed-door hearing, but who had previously stated that "several separatist ecosystems" operate in France, at least fourteen , structured around mosques or associations of Salafist inspiration or linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. On the ground, the numbers speak for themselves. Alexandre Brugère, prefect of the Hauts-de-Seine, indicated seventy structures under surveillance in his department alone.
Hence the policy line outlined by the Ministry of the Interior : broaden the criteria for dissolving organizations to include threats to social cohesion; strengthen European cooperation to prevent dissolved associations from re-establishing themselves abroad; freeze assets in the event of dissolution; intensify controls on Koranic schools and association financial flows; and give prefects the power to oppose the construction of places of worship if there are signs of separatism or infiltration.
Hence the 32 recommendations with which the commission seeks to translate the alarm into action: stricter controls on subsidies to associations, better information for parliamentarians, operational support for local elected officials through training, intelligence sharing, and structured dialogue with prefects. Particular attention is paid to the most exposed sectors—schools, associations, sports, social networks—where political Islamism finds fertile ground to take root.
The testimony of a former LFI leader in the North , Cédric Brun, further cements the picture. His accusation is the most brutal and the reason he left the party: "It's not a matter of infiltration, but of a deliberate political strategy aimed at welcoming these profiles to gain the missing votes in the second round of the presidential election. It's a cynical choice. The rapprochement between La France Insoumise and these individuals, close to Iran or other countries, and recipients of foreign funding, constitutes a threat to our democracy."
