"Frankfurt-style counterexamples fail to show that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is not required for moral responsibility… The key to my response is that events, including acts, should be individuated in a fine-grained way. I take what Fischer calls the “essentialist principle of event individuation” to be correct. This principle states that “x is the same particular event as y if and only if x and y have the same causes.”6 Thus, it is not enough to say that the act E, which Jones performs, is Jones’s voting for Al Gore (to alter a Frankfurt-style example of Fisher’s). There might be several different acts that could fall under such a general heading… Although Jones presumably does not know that he is in Frankfurt-style circumstances, and thus does not know that the alternative acts open to his free causal contribution are Jones’s voting for Gore as a result of an unimpeded personal decision to do so, and Jones’s voting for Gore as a result of the impeding intervention of Black after Jones showed an inclination to vote for Bush, there are in fact these two acts, each of which Jones has the ability to bring about in the circumstances in which he is. In performing the first act, Jones thus does have the ability to do otherwise, and PAP thus remains intact."

--- Divine Providence and human libertarian freedom: reasons for incompatibility and theological alternatives, James D. Rissler,