This lack of collaborative and effective management at the cabinet level over the five years between September 2015 and August 2020 was a significant problem and represents a challenge for a future government to overcome. Parties in power must do more than create a starting plan; they also must ensure that the structure is in place to continually update and refresh objectives. Only by getting that right can they ensure that key elements of their policies and platform are implemented in an ever more difficult political environment...
It was one of the few — the very few — times we had met to discuss matters in private, without the presence of advisors or other sources of counsel. That kind of thing simply didn’t happen in Justin Trudeau’s world. Virtually any topic you wanted to discuss with the prime minister — official or informal, strategy or gossip — had to be shared in the presence of members of his staff.
This was an acknowledged fact among everyone who had reason to converse with him. While he appeared as a charming individual who could mingle among crowds of strangers, sharing hugs, smiles and selfies, he seemed to avoid solitary encounters. On the one hand, it was understandable and, to some extent, judicious for a political leader. Having another listener or two in the room would be useful to confirm what had or had not been said about a subject or policy. On the other hand, there are times when the presence of others, not only in the room but in the conversation, inhibits frank exchanges of ideas and opinions. Occasions arise in business and in politics where an individual welcomes private access to a leader, an event almost unheard of within the Trudeau government. More to the point, solid relationships are built not among crowds but in the private exchange of personal expressions and in the give-and-take of shared views and experiences. None of these appeared to occur with any frequency. Opportunities for frank exchanges are the basis for building relationships, whether personal, professional or political. Everything of value we achieve in life is based on relationships, and relationships are built on a one-to-one basis. Speak to a crowd of a hundred or a thousand people and you may get your point across and generate applause, but that’s not a relationship that builds the kind of two-way trust and partnership that’s essential in managing a business or governing a country.
The lack of that kind of rapport between the prime minister and members of his cabinet didn’t appear to be a critical factor until problems emerged. That’s when the absence of personal connections sowed the seeds for a breakdown among many members of the team. In retrospect it’s easy to see how the quandaries involving Jody Wilson-Raybould, Jane Philpott and me grew in scope and impact; it was difficult for each side to fully grasp the other’s case and their reasons for clinging to their position.
This was especially galling to me. I have made relationships the key to the successes I achieved in family, business and public life. The absence of opportunity to build deep, meaningful connections in the political arena was both discomforting and dangerous.
It was also a serious flaw in the roles that the prime minister and I were entrusted to play...
I began by explaining to the prime minister that the leaks from his office about me and my ministry had become intolerable. They had grown in both number and degree of malice, fed to the media with the apparent intent — there was no other way to put it — of limiting the potential for my team and me to advocate for and implement the policies and programs that, from our research and analysis, we believed would most appropriately address the acute economic challenges we were facing in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. A story by Reuters claimed the PMO considered me stingy about the cost of pandemic recovery plans, and that I was reluctant to invest in green initiatives — this at a time when we were proposing programs dealing with the climate crisis that were more significant than at any other time in Canada’s history...
The leaks and planted stories had poisoned the atmosphere to the point where there were few, if any, alternatives available beyond submitting my resignation.
Let’s make it clear: Justin Trudeau has many talents as a politician, all of them apparent to anyone who observes him in a public forum. But he also possesses a number of weaknesses. These had become evident during discussions of programs dealing with the pandemic, and one of the most striking was his lack of focus on policy details. Leaving the development of policy responses to his PMO staff meant that debates were conducted and conclusions reached without his presence. The real clashes happened over things that we had never discussed...
He replied that he was not aware of the leaks, and he had no idea where they had come from.
Really? For weeks, I and the rest of Canada had been absorbing a barrage of revelations about a supposedly growing rift between the two of us, information that could only have originated within the PMO. The prime minister’s claim that he had not been aware of them and had no idea of their source could only be interpreted in one of two ways: Either he was mismanaging the PMO, permitting it to function free of his knowledge and direction while it spread false rumours about one of his top appointees. Or he was purposefully not telling me the whole truth...
It’s not that he didn’t discuss policy with others, but that he often did not come to the table with a fully formed opinion. He came to listen to the people in the PMO, and frequently adopted their perspective with little input or pushback, letting their points of view prevail with limited exceptions.
Key to many decisions shaped in the PMO was reaching a judgment about who would front programs in the media. “If we’re going to launch this program,” the thinking would go, “we need this kind of person to get the coverage we want in the press.”
This created a cast of cabinet members chosen not necessarily for what they brought to the business of governing but to the needs of promotion, and I realized that those of us in cabinet had been chosen because we fit in a box. Depending upon the PR goals at the time, the appropriate box was trundled into the spotlight and the lid removed...
It appeared, in many instances, that the prime minister floated above the issues he confronted, choosing not to get his hands dirty in dealing with the mechanics and implications of the issues before him. Many senior executives play a similar role, trusting specialists to deal with inner details. This does not, however, free them from understanding and grappling with the often-messy details of getting things done. Nor should it. Good management, in any capacity, is not about conveniently turning a blind eye to remain above the fray. It’s about keeping both eyes open to foresee risks and consequences, and taking steps to avoid or at least minimize them.
I hadn’t witnessed the prime minister taking any of these steps...
In my experience, no CEO of any business achieved success without seeking other points of view, especially from departments and their heads responsible for piloting the program. But I saw this disregard of other opinions frequently occurring in government, with political operatives deciding on a direction to take and manipulating the outcome through well-placed leaks, stories planted in the press and on social media. Carefully crafted and strategically employed, they drove conclusions before an elected cabinet minister could finish reading the briefing documents, let alone reach a reasoned conclusion on the subject and consider the best way forward.
Decisions were too often made first, with discussions on how to execute them coming later. Once things got underway, effective reviews on the progress of the program were rarely if ever conducted, at least at the political level.
These and other management missteps, in my opinion, were almost impossible for Justin Trudeau’s government to overcome in its second term and beyond, leading to less than satisfying results — that is, two consecutive minority governments — and adding to the polarization of political views among Canadians. Yet this was the same regime that had vaulted the federal Liberal Party from third place to a clear majority in 2015 — a victory achieved thanks in no small part to the irresistible blend of Justin Trudeau’s personal appeal, the failing allure of Stephen Harper and a Liberal agenda that captured the imagination of Canadians worried about rising inequality, the impact of climate change and their country’s place in the world.
Let’s be clear about this: I was both proud and eager to take part in the Liberal team that secured a majority in the federal election of 2015 and that set out to achieve a range of clearly established and historically significant objectives well beyond its first term.
So, what happened?
Good management involves the ability to execute the elements in plans and programs to meet specific goals. If the ability to take these steps is missing, or not enough time is made available to devise and apply them, disaster is often imminent.
When the political talent responsible for much of the Party’s 2015 election success was put into management roles at the PMO, without the advantage of a team of experienced colleagues, the writing was on the wall: the plan that led to political success was not refreshed, the execution of initiatives was constantly behind and the ability to attract and retain new talent was not prioritized.
More importantly, there was no healthy tension between policies that focused on growth versus policies that focused on fairer distribution of wealth. The team that won was directed by one set of objectives, avoiding contrasting perspectives that might have led to a more balanced set of policies. When key people left, inevitably burned out or just burned by politics, there was no capacity to ensure that a breadth of perspectives was considered in managing some of the most important files in the country — the ones that would lead to increased growth and opportunities for Canada.
Prime Minister Trudeau had scored a brilliant electoral success in part by assembling a well-qualified team to shape and execute the campaign. Unfortunately, during the first year or so after securing his majority he apparently failed to ask himself if the team that had contributed to his success was also the best to help govern the country. These are, after all, two distinctively different functions. A team that works well to achieve a sharply defined, specific short-term objective rarely succeeds at helping to formulate and execute long-term goals across a wide range of issues.
Good managers make those kinds of decisions as part of their duties. They evaluate who demonstrates the best skills for the job at hand, assigning duties to match capabilities. The job doesn’t end there; they make sure the team is up to the task, and they make decisions to upgrade or augment the team when needed.
That’s not a duty to take lightly, in politics or business. It’s the nuts-and-bolts aspect of getting things done in a leadership role. Personnel assessment and, where necessary, reassignment are a form of preventive maintenance for good managers. Unexpected and unwelcomed events require handling in a direct and effective manner, with minimum improvising. The process should not rely on orchestrated media leaks or anticipated deniability to get the job done.
You don’t need a Harvard MBA to grasp this concept. The essential component in understanding and applying it is an ability to develop collaborative relationships, engaging people with proven abilities into your orbit not as supporters but as allies working toward achieving defined goals. Without a focus on building a broader team and generating meaningful discussions around the right goals for the country, we moved down a path that started with great promise and ran headfirst into an inevitable challenge: How do you refresh your agenda to consider the most important next set of priorities?...
In response to the negative groundswell against the Harper proposal, we pledged that if elected the Liberal Party would scrap the Conservative plan, maintaining 65 as the eligibility age to receive retirement benefits. For this we were applauded by, among others, members of the Canadian Association of Retired Persons, which advocates benefits for seniors...
Justin Trudeau recognized the value of Harper’s proposal, but he appeared to have discarded it to reap extra votes and improve the chances for a Liberal victory. The move left me disconcerted. I was reminded of a quote attributed to a popular football coach in the U.S.: “Winning,” he had preached, “isn’t everything. It’s the only thing.” Whatever its impact on his players, the line left little room for principles within the coach’s personal system of values...
Lacking in many of Justin Trudeau’s cabinet appointees, men and women alike, was managerial experience. That’s at the heart of the job, after all. Making public statements or delivering sound bites to the media on a given subject may be the most visible actions by ministers, but they should not be the only measure of their performance. Each minister oversees a department that can comprise several hundred staff members — or thousands, depending on the ministry. Even with the assistance of the highly competent federal bureaucracy, the responsibilities of a federal minister weigh heavily on those who lack management experience.
It wasn’t just novice cabinet ministers who needed an adjustment period. Those closest to the prime minister — operators like Gerry Butts and Katie Telford in the PMO, and Cyrus Reporter, chief of staff at the federal Liberal office — found themselves on a bigger, more brilliantly lit stage, playing more prominent leading roles and facing a larger, more aggressively critical audience. The decision not to rely on experienced insiders from previous governments may have satisfied the urge to demonstrate a new way of doing business, but it left open the possibility of rookie mistakes, an enduring problem for the Trudeau PMO...
An early signal of some of the challenges I would encounter came from the prime minister’s declaration to cabinet that all ministries would be considered equal in power and status. The driver for this statement was clearly to avoid hierarchies in the cabinet, including questions of gender parity. I saw this as completely unnecessary, since we had highly capable women in the roles of health, justice and international trade. In addition, clearly talented people like Carla Qualtrough, Mélanie Joly and Patty Hajdu, among others, played essential roles initially, and their influence would grow over time. Would acting on this general notion of equality, even if it was not really anything other than an empty statement, create other issues when it came to cabinet dynamics? For example, would it mean that each minister would be given equal time to speak in cabinet meetings? Would it require me to give equal weight to every request for funds? It all seemed an unnecessary effort to focus on the egalitarian aspect of Justin Trudeau’s vision, which played well in some quarters but was, frankly, often impractical. Effective management was being sacrificed at the altar of image and presentation, and not for the last time...
Prime Minister Trudeau provided the sunshine and spirit, and his team was supposed to add substance and structure. By 2019 much of the sunshine had faded, and his team was depleted...
The disciplined practice of having a defined policy goal and a specific fiscal envelope wasn’t maintained through our term where the budget process was concerned. Our success on achieving key policy objectives was blemished by a lack of proper design and management of the process. The unwillingness of the prime minister and the PMO to agree on the setting of financial targets at the beginning of the budget process meant we were not forced to make difficult choices between competing policy priorities. It’s easy — or at least easier — to deliver on policy commitments if there are no fiscal guardrails. Budgeting is a foundational element of government, but it only really works with targets and constraints, just like any budget.
As time passed, I realized we were unlikely to achieve the fiscal targets I might have liked because many decisions were being made outside of my control. I remained committed to our policy objectives, but I could not persuade the PM and the PMO that fiscal discipline meant we had only limited capacity to move forward on our goals...
One reason I took to the idea of running for office in 2015 was Canada’s slumping economic performance...
Canada’s economic growth had been stalled for two decades or more, and it needed to be resuscitated. According to the OECD, Canada had been outpaced in the recent past by 138 countries including Australia, Mexico, New Zealand and the USA...
Building and renewing infrastructure demanded a large amount of capital and extended time frames to complete projects, plus provincial and municipal buy-in. On the international front, our strategy to expand trade opportunities with China ran up against hard-nosed geopolitical realities, and implementing other promising initiatives encountered obstacles that couldn’t be easily sidestepped.
The focus on economic renewal deserved to be sharpened and directed by the prime minister, but it was not. I was prepared to play any meaningful role to reach the goal, but responsibility for economic growth cannot be delegated to the finance minister alone. It requires attention at the very top. In my view neither the PM nor the PMO saw the need to address our anemic growth record as a first priority, despite a raft of statistics confirming it and the need to treat it as a priority.
There are many ways to define true economic success, but any way you slice it, it is based on productivity...
From the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, few countries exceeded Canada’s rate of economic growth. As one measure, the weekly earnings of Canadians grew at an average of 2.54 percent annually over that period after accounting for inflation, more than doubling our earned income. Pretty impressive, but from 1982 to 2019, our country’s real GDP rose an average of just 1.3 percent annually, which is not impressive at all...
What’s behind the drop-off in productivity growth? Have Canadians become lazy? Do we no longer understand the importance of being productive as individuals and corporations? Are we content to let the rest of the world race past us?
I don’t buy any of those theories. Instead, I count several factors that explain our weak performance. One has been our declining level of capital investment over the years. Let’s remember the point I made earlier about change and understand that other countries will change according to their needs and abilities without waiting for us to catch up.
The amount of money invested to keep our productivity competitive with other countries has at best been stagnant over recent years. Canada spent about $5,000 per available worker on that goal in 1991. We were outpaced by the U.S., which invested around $7,500 per worker, and by other OECD countries whose investment levels were almost double our own. Thirty years later our investment level per worker was under $10,000, while in other OECD countries it had climbed to almost $15,000, and the U.S. easily surpassed $20,000.
Associated with this less than stellar record has been our poor performance when it comes to innovation; we depend too often on others to lead the way. That’s a bronze medal approach that may make us feel good but achieves little of substance. Canada’s subpar performance is linked with a lack of investment on vital issues. Our funding of research and development is not only unimpressive, it has been declining over the years. In 2018, OECD countries spent just under 2.5 percent of GDP on research and development, flowing from private businesses, higher educational institutions and government. Canada spent barely 1.5 percent, a number that is still falling.
As difficult as this reckoning may be, historically and for the future, we can expect it will become harder to grow our economy given the challenges we’ll face. Much of our success over the post-war period can be attributed to our position as a trading country during a time when globalization expanded trading opportunities. Now, facing populism and geopolitical issues, we can expect deglobalization — a new headwind that will impinge on our ability to grow (see the Biden administration’s “Buy American” policy as an example very close to home)...
I have spent considerable time on this topic because my years of experience in office convinced me that productivity improvement is the most important issue on our agenda, and we are not focused on it.
The implications of ignoring this aspect of Canada are more than significant — they are critical.
Without focusing on our economic growth to produce an improvement, we will not be able to engineer the energy transition process. Nor will we be able to seriously address the problem of polarization without expanding opportunities for everyone. Our next prime minister, reflecting on the key elements in the party’s platform, must consider economic growth as the most important goal of the federal government.
Absent that objective, every other policy initiative must be, by necessity, constrained."
--- Where To from Here: A Path to Canadian Prosperity / Bill Morneau