"Often it does seem a pity that Noah and his party did not miss the boat." - Mark Twain
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What Terrorists Really Want / Max Abrahms (Continued):
"Fourth, case studies of al-Qaida, Aum Shinrikyo. Hezbollah, the IRA, the RAF, the Weather Underground, and Chechen and Palestinian terrorist groups... emphasize that social bonds preceded ideological commitment, which was an effect, not a cause, of becoming a terrorist member...
Fifth, many terrorist root soldiers and even their leaders never develop a basic understanding of their organization’s political purpose. This finding strengthens the argument that ideological commitment cnters through the back door, if at all, of terrorist organizations. In his study of the IRA, for example, Robert White found that nearly half of the terrorists he interviewed were unaware of the discrimination in Northern Ireland against Catholics, despite the salience of this issue in IRA communiqués.” According to Olivier Roy, Mia Bloom, and a former mujahideen, al-Qaida foot soldiers and their leaders are often ignorant about the basic tenets of Islam, if not bin Laden’s political vision. Al-Qaida is unexceptional in this regard; Richardson’s research shows that “a striking and quite surprising” aspect of terrorism is that the leaders of “very different terrorist movements” are unable to explain their basic political purpose.” When asked to describe the society that their organizations hoped to achieve, the leader of the Shining Path conceded, “We have not studied the question sufficiently”; the founder of the RAF responded, “That is not our concern”; the leader of the Japanese Red Army replied, “We really do not know what it will be like”; and the spokesman for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia acknowledged, “I must admit that we have yet to define this aspect.” Audrey Cronin has found that leaders of both left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups are also “notorious for their inability to articulate a clear vision of their [political] goals.” That even terrorist leaders frequently cannot explain their organizations’ political purpose suggests that members have a different motive for participating in them.’
Sixth, terrorist organizations focus their recruitment on the socially isolated, not on people with a demonstrable commitment to their given political cause...
Seventh, terrorist ursanizrions are particularly attractive outlets for those seeking solidarity According to political psychologists, terrorist groups are far more tight-knit than other voluntary associations because of the extreme dangers and costs of participation, as well as their tendency to violate societal expectations. This observation may account for the fact that even when terrorist organizations fail to achieve their political platforms, committing acts of terrorism tends to generate new recruits, boost membership morale, and otherwise strengthen the social unit...
Based on her interviews with terrorists, Jessica Stern has likened [terrorist training camps] to an “Outward Bound” experience for young men seeking challenges, excitement, and above all “friendship” with fellow terrorists of diverse political backgrounds...
The tendency for terrorist groups to die out in the course of a “human life cycle”—irrespective of the state of their pobtical grievances—suggests that they appeal to new members primarily for social, not political, reasons...
True to the model, terrorist organizations (1) prolong their existence by relying on a strategy that hardens target governments from making policy concessions; (2) ensure their continued viability by resisting opportunities to peacefully participate in the democratic process; (3) avoid disbanding by reflexively rejecting negotiated settlements that offer significant policy concessions; (4) guarantee their survival by espousing a litany of protean political goals that can never be fully satisfied;’30 (5) avert organization-threatening reprisals by conducting anonymous attacks, even though they preclude the possibility of coercing policy concessions; (6) annihilate ideologically identical terrorist organizations that compete for members, despite the adverse effect on their stated political cause; and (7) refuse to split up after the armed struggle has proven politically unsuccessful for decades or its political rationale has become moot.
None of these common tendencies of terrorist organizations advances their official political agendas. but all of them help to ensure the survival of the social unit...
Demand-side strategies should focus on divesting terrorism’s social utility, in two ways. First, it is vital to drive a wedge between organization members. Since the advent of modern terrorism in the late 1960s, the sole counter-terrorism strategy that was a clear-cut success attacked the social bonds of the terrorist organization, not its utility as a political instrument. By commuting prison sentences in the early 1980s in exchange for actionable intelligence against their fellow Brigatisti, the Italian government infiltrated the Red Brigades, bred mistrust and resentment among the members, and quickly rolled up the organization)3S Similar deals should be cut with al-Qaida in cases where detainees’ prior involvement in terrorism and their likelihood of rejoining the underground are minor. Greater investment in developing and seeding double agents will also go a long way toward weakening the social ties undergirding terrorist organizations and cells around the world."